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translating or transcribing text, providing opinions or ideas, and similar – all tasks that computers are not
good at or where they may even fail altogether. The introduction of humans into computations and/or every-
day work, however, also poses critical, novel challenges in terms of quality control, as the crowd is typically
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1. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is the outsourcing of a piece of work to a crowd of people via an open
call for contributions [Howe 2006]. In crowdsourcing, one group of people (so-called re-
questers) submit tasks to a crowdsourcing platform (or service); another group of people
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(the workers that form the crowd) contribute to solving the task. The result of solving
the task is called an output. Requesters may evaluate outputs and reward workers
depending on the respective quality; in situations where requesters delegate respon-
sibility for quality control to the crowdsourcing platform, outputs may be checked and
rewarded directly and automatically by the crowdsourcing service itself. Rewards can
be money, gifts, reputation badges or similar [Minder and Bernstein 2012].
Depending on the task to crowdsource and the acceptance criteria by both the re-
quester and the workers to enter a mutual business relationship, different negotiation
models have emerged so far: The marketplace model [Ipeirotis 2010] targets so-called
micro-tasks of limited complexity, such as tagging a picture or translating a piece of
text, for which the requester typically requires a large number of answers. Prominent
examples of crowdsourcing platforms that implement the marketplace model are Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk, Microworkers and CrowdFlower. The contest model [Cavallo and
Jain 2012] is particularly suitable to creative works where the requester fixes the bud-
get he is willing to spend and workers compete with their solutions for the reward.
Examples are 99designs, InnoCentive and IdeaScale. The auction model [Satzger et al.
2013] targets works where the requester fixes the acceptance criteria and workers bid
for the task. An example of auction platform is Freelancer. But also volunteering, e.g.,
like in Wikipedia or Crowdcrafting, has proven its viability, and the spectrum of vari-
ations of these models is growing.
The critical aspect is that outputs produced by the crowd must be checked for qual-
ity, since they are produced by workers with unknown or varied skills and motiva-
tions [Minder and Bernstein 2012; Malone et al. 2010]. The quality of a crowdsourced
task is multifaceted and depends on the quality of the workers involved in its exe-
cution, the quality of the processes that govern the creation of tasks, the selection
of workers, the coordination of sub-tasks like reviewing intermediary outputs, aggre-
gating individual contributions, etc. A large body of empirical studies confirms that
existing crowdsourcing platforms are not robust to effectively check and control the
quality of crowdsourced tasks or to defend against attacks such as cheating, manip-
ulating task outputs, or extracting sensitive information from crowdsourcing systems
[Kritikos et al. 2013]. Concerns about the unintended consequences of poor quality
control methods, including financial, intellectual property and privacy risks, malicious
attacks, and project failure are growing [Minder and Bernstein 2012; Malone et al.
2010; Kritikos et al. 2013].
To be fair, it is important to note that platform providers may not have the necessary
information about tasks to approach these concerns appropriately. For instance, in
marketplace platforms task design is typically fully under the control of the requester,
and the platform is not aware if the tasks raises intellectual property issues or not.
Some quality control and submission filtering activities may therefore also be carried
out by the requester outside the platform to meet expected levels of quality. Task-
specific platforms, such as 99designs for graphical design tasks, instead, are well aware
of the problem (e.g., intellectual property rights) and help requesters and workers to
manage them. They can do so, as they focus on few specific task types only, which they
know and can support well.
The increasing importance of crowdsourcing services and the intensification of global
competition indicate however that building proper solutions to quality problems should
now be a top priority. Ideally, developers of crowdsourcing applications should be of-
fered effective quality control techniques, methods and tools that let them systemati-
cally build, verify and change quality control mechanisms to suit their requirements.
Yet, no framework exists that endows crowdsourcing services with robust and flexible
quality control mechanisms, and most research on quality control in crowdsourcing
has focused on single, specific aspects of quality only, such as worker reputation or
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Fig. 1: The basic crowdsourcing scenario with its quality aspects.
redundancy. In addition, conceived quality control techniques are typically embedded
inside proprietary platforms and not generalizable. Consequently, designing, building
and maintaining robust and flexible crowdsourcing quality controls remains a deeply
challenging and partly unsolved problem, and requesters and platform operators may
not have the knowledge, skills or understanding to craft an own quality-aware strat-
egy to safely take advantage of the opportunities offered by crowdsourcing. For in-
stance, Stol and Fitzgerald [2014] describe a case study on crowdsourced software de-
velopment that shows how unpreparedness to handle quality issues quickly increased
project costs. Lasecki et al. [2014] show how state-of-the-art crowd-powered systems
are still not ready to deal with “active attacks”, while Gadiraju et al. [2015] show that
malicious workers can easily cause harm if suitable quality controls are missing.
This survey aims to shed light on the problem of quality control in crowdsourcing and
to help users of crowdsourcing services and developers of crowdsourcing applications to
understand the various moments where quality comes into play in the crowdsourcing
process, how it is manifest (or not), and how it can be assessed and assured via suitable
methods and actions. Concretely, it provides the following contributions:
— An introduction to quality control in crowdsourcing (Section 2) and a taxonomy to
understand and classify the state of the art in quality control techniques for crowd-
sourcing. The taxonomy focuses on the three core aspects of quality:
— The quality model that emerges from the state of the art (Section 3), that is, the
dimensions and attributes to describe quality in crowdsourcing services.
— The assessment (the measuring and its methods) of the values of the attributes
identified by the quality model (Section 4). In order to instantiate the quality
model, it is necessary to know and master the respective assessment methods.
— The assurance of quality (Section 5), that is, the set of actions that aim to achieve
expected levels of quality. To prevent low quality, it is paramount to understand
how to design for quality and how to intervene if quality drops below expectations.
— A comprehensive analysis of how state-of-the-art crowdsourcing platforms and ser-
vices support quality control in practice (Sections 6).
— A discussion of shortcomings and limitations along with the respective challenges
and opportunities for future research and development (Section 7).
2. QUALITY IN CROWDSOURCING
Quality (and its control) is an active research area in several computing disciplines,
including data quality [Batini et al. 2009; Hunter et al. 2013], quality of software
products [Herbsleb et al. 1997; Jung et al. 2004], software services [Kritikos et al.
2013], and user interfaces [Hartmann et al. 2008]. In many cases, research from these
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Fig. 2: The components of the quality control taxonomy and their internal structures.
fields is complementary to quality control in crowdsourcing, and some elements can
be adopted to leverage application-specific quality control mechanisms (e.g., some code
quality metrics can be leveraged in programming crowdsourcing tasks). However, the
peculiarities of crowdsourcing require taking into account novel quality issues that are
rising, especially to consider the user involvement in the execution of different tasks,
e.g., production of contents, annotations, and evaluations.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider that in crowdsourcing systems the quality of
the output is influenced by multiple factors (see Figure 1): The requester defines and
publishes tasks to be executed by the crowd via a crowdsourcing platform or a dedi-
cated application. The crowd produces outputs that are checked for quality and deliv-
ered to the requester. The output quality depends, among others, on the profiles and
abilities of workers, the description of the tasks, the incentives provided, the processes
implemented to detect malicious behaviors or low-quality data, as well as on the repu-
tation of and collaboration by the requester. The quality of the output can therefore be
expressed by means of quality dimensions that model objective and subjective aspects
of data and product quality, while the actual quality of the outputs is influenced by
aspects related to people (the workers, requesters and possible other actors), software
(the crowdsourcing platform or application and the design of tasks) and process quality
(the organization of work and the implemented quality measures).
Adapting the expectation-centric definition of quality (e.g., [Lewis and Booms 1983])
to crowdsourcing, we define the quality of a crowdsourced task as the extent to which
the output meets and/or exceeds the requester’s expectations.
2.1. Taxonomy
Considering the current fragmented literature and lack of an all-encompassing view
of quality control in crowdsourcing, we developed the taxonomy depicted in Figure 2 to
understand and analyze how quality is dealt with in crowdsourcing. The proposed tax-
onomy features a holistic view on the problem of quality control in crowdsourcing and
aims to highlight the key aspects and options one has to face when developing quality
control mechanisms. The taxonomy is based on our own experience [Allahbakhsh et al.
2013; Cappiello et al. 2011; Kritikos et al. 2013; Batini et al. 2009] as well as on an
extensive literature review of related areas, discussions with colleagues, experimenta-
tion with systems and prototypes, which allowed us to identify common building blocks
for the different variations in quality control mechanisms. Accordingly, we propose a
taxonomy with three categories that may, in turn, be split into sub-categories:
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— A quality model for crowdsourcing that captures which quality dimensions and at-
tributes have been identified so far in the literature.
— Dimensions represent the components that constitute a crowdsourcing task, such
as the input and output data of the task or the people involved in the task. Dimen-
sions are described by attributes and are not directly measurable.
— Attributes characterize properties (qualities) of the task, such as the accuracy of
data or the expertise of workers. Attributes are concrete if they are measurable;
they are abstract if they are not directly measurable and values are derived from
concrete attributes, e.g., aggregations.
— An analysis of the quality assessment methods that have been used so far to assess
quality attributes in the context of crowdsourcing.
— Techniques distinguish who performs the assessment from a high level of abstrac-
tion. For instance, techniques that involve single individuals (e.g., rating) differ
from techniques that involve groups of people (e.g., voting).
— Assessment methods allow one to measure quality attributes. For example, accu-
racy may be measured comparing outputs with a ground truth, while worker ex-
pertise may be measured through questionnaires. Methods are like functions that
are executed automatically, manually or both and produce a value as output.
— A study of the quality assurance actions that allow one to improve quality by acting
on the quality attributes identified in the quality model.
— Strategies represent the top-level decisions to be taken when aiming at improving
quality, that is, what to act upon and in which direction. For instance, selecting
good workers and training workers are two different strategies that aim to im-
prove the quality of the people involved in a task.
— Actions are the basic operations one can perform to prevent or fix quality problems,
such as checking credentials or showing a training video. Each action implements
a specific strategy.
In the following sections, we detail each of these components and explain them with
the help from the respective literature.
2.2. Literature Selection
In order to identify the references to consider in this survey, we selected a set of confer-
ences and journals that, to the best of our knowledge, publish research on crowdsourc-
ing and related topics. The conferences considered were: AAAI, BPM, CAiSE, CHI,
CI, CIKM, CSCW, ECML, ECSCW, HCOMP, ICML, ICSE, ICWE, iUI, KDD, NIPS,
SIGIR, UBICOMP, UIST, VLDB, WSDM, and WWW. The journals considered were:
ACM CSUR, ACM TIIS, ACM TOCHI, ACM TOIS, ACM TOIT, ACM TOSEM, ACM
TWEB, Communications of the ACM, CSCW, Information Systems, IEEE Computer,
IEEE Internet Computing, IEEE TKDE, IEEE TSC, IEEE TSE, VLDB, and WWW. In
order to keep the selection of references manageable and up to date, we queried for
contributions from 2009 onwards using the following keywords in either title, abstract
or keywords: Crowd, Crowdsourcing, Human Computation, Collective Intelligence, So-
cial Computing, Collaborative Computing, Collaborative Systems, Wikinomics, Mass
Collaboration, Micro-tasking, Crowd Labour. Articles were retrieved through the ad-
vanced search feature of the ACM Digital Library and SCOPUS. Papers published in
HCOMP and Collective Intelligence were retrieved manually, as at the time of query-
ing they were not properly indexed by any digital library. The selection specifically
looked for conference and journal papers, and neglected demo papers, posters and
workshop papers. The search identified 1013 papers. A further manual check filtered
out 257 papers that we finally considered relevant for this survey. Additional papers
considered stem from prior knowledge by the authors.
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3. CROWDSOURCING QUALITY MODEL
Figure 3 illustrates the quality model identified as a result of this survey. We identify
the following dimensions to group the quality attributes in crowdsourcing systems:
— Data: This refers to the data required to perform a task or produced as a result of per-
forming a task by a worker, i.e, task input and output data. For instance, input data
can be images to label or a text to translate, and the corresponding output data can
be the labels of the images and the translated text. Quality control in crowdsourcing
all revolves around achieving high-quality output data, which is the core challenge
for mass adoption of crowd work [Kittur et al. 2013].
— Task: The type of work proposed, the way it is described and how it is implemented
strongly affects the attractiveness of a task and the quality of the outputs that can
be achieved. We distinguish the following sub-dimensions:
— Description: This is the description of the work the requester asks the crowd to per-
form; it includes the instructions of how to perform the task and possible context
information. The clarity and details of the description influence the way workers
perform the task and hence the quality of its output [Chandler et al. 2013].
— User interface: This is the software user interface workers use to perform the task.
In most tasks, this interface is a simple HTML form through which workers sub-
mit their contributions. But it can also come in the form of a stand-alone applica-
tion with input techniques not supported by standard HTML forms (e.g., selecting
patterns in a model). The quality of the user interface determines how easily work-
ers can perform tasks [Marcus et al. 2012].
— Incentives: Crowdsourcing generally implies paid, online work. The incentives,
that is, the stimuli the requester offers to attract workers to tasks, plays therefore
a crucial role in crowdsourcing. Incentives may come in two different forms: ex-
trinsic incentives (e.g., rewards) and intrinsic incentives (e.g., worker status). Sev-
eral studies have identified direct relations between incentives and output quality
and/or task execution speed [Singer and Mittal 2013].
— Terms and conditions: These are the general rules and arrangements that govern
the work relationship between the requester and the workers. Aspects like the pri-
vacy of workers, the protection of intellectual property (IP), compliance with laws,
ethical standards, and similar are typically specified here. Terms and conditions
affect worker interest and legal aspects [Wolfson and Lease 2011].
— Performance: Performance expresses the amount of useful work completed in the
context of a crowdsourced task compared to the time and resources needed for
its processing. Crowdsourcing can be an intricate endeavor, with large volumes of
input data to be processed and hundreds or thousands of workers involved, that
can easily grow complex. Controlling the consumption of resources is of utmost
importance to guarantee the sustainability of crowdsourcing initiatives.
— People: These are the actors involved in the task, including requesters, workers, and
the crowd. Good work requires qualified, prepared and trusted people. In some tasks,
workers may also be required to collaborate with other workers or requesters. We
distinguish three sub-dimensions regarding the people involved in crowdsourcing:
— Requester: The first sub-dimension acknowledges the role of the requester, who
is not only the one that crowdsources work, but also the one that may evaluate
outputs and interact with workers. Fairness and communication are examples of
attributes of a good requester [Irani and Silberman 2013; Allahbakhsh et al. 2012].
— Worker: The other natural sub-dimension focuses on the workers. Substantial
work has been done on discriminating good from bad workers. We group the iden-
tified attributes into profile, credentials, and experiences, in function of what the
attributes describe. Profile characterizes an individual’s identity (age, gender, lo-
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Fig. 3: The quality model for crowdsourcing tasks emerged from literature with dimen-
sions (boxes with shadow) and attributes (boxes without shadow).
cation) and describes the individual’s distinctive character, typically expressed
through motivation and so-called personality traits, i.e., relatively stable, endur-
ing properties of people that can influence behavior [John et al. 2008]. Credentials
are documented qualifications that people bring into a system from the outside.
Experiences express knowledge acquired or social relations established by using a
system; they are usually based on system-specific metrics and rules.
— Group: Finally, people can be studied also in groups, e.g., the crowd as a whole or
smaller teams of collaborating workers. Good groups, for instance, are formed by
non-colluding workers [KhudaBukhsh et al. 2014] or by workers that are able to
perform also very diverse tasks with good quality.
We describe the attributes that characterize each dimension next. Appendix A sum-
marizes the referenced literature.
3.1. Data Quality
A large body of work focused on characterizing and handling data quality in the context
of crowdsourcing. The most important attribute studied is the accuracy of output data
[Hansen et al. 2013; Kazai 2011a; Yin et al. 2014]. Several synonyms are used to refer
to accuracy, such as “goodness” [Cao et al. 2014], “correctness” [Yin et al. 2014], or just
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generically “quality” [Eickhoff et al. 2012; Kulkarni et al. 2012a; Kern et al. 2010].
Data consistency is commonly interpreted as the similarity between outputs produced
by different workers in response to a same input. It has been studied, for instance,
in the context of peer consistency evaluation [Huang and Fu 2013b; Eickhoff et al.
2012]. The timeliness of data is the property of outputs to be available in useful time
for further processing [Kittur et al. 2013]. Timeliness is especially important in near-
realtime crowdsourcing scenarios [Lasecki et al. 2013; Lasecki et al. 2013] and has also
been studied under the name of “reaction time” [Yin et al. 2014].
It is important to note that next to these quality attributes that characterize the
quality of a dataset in general terms, many crowdsourcing scenarios ask for the use
of ad-hoc attributes that are able to capture task-specific properties. For instance, Yu
et al. [2014] study the accuracy, coverage, and conciseness of textual summaries; the
latter two attributes are specific to the problem of summarizing texts. Nguyen et al.
[2014] distinguish between 13 different features to assess narrative similarity.
3.2. Task Description Quality
Regarding the quality of task descriptions, its clarity is of utmost importance [Hoss-
feld et al. 2014]. Tokarchuk et al. [2012] state that clarity positively correlates with
performance, a result that is empirically confirmed by Georgescu et al. [2012], while
Kulkarni et al. [2012b] specifically study the problem of incomplete descriptions. Need-
less to say, if a worker does not immediately understand a task, he will not be willing to
work on it. Several authors have studied the complexity of tasks (or “granularity” [Hu
et al. 2012]), identified correlations with worker motivation [Rogstadius et al. 2011],
and matched workers with tasks based on complexity scores [Difallah et al. 2013].
3.3. User Interface Quality
A user-friendly, understandable interface can attract more workers and increase the
quality of outputs [Allahbakhsh et al. 2013]. In this respect, especially usability as
been studied, e.g., for workers from low-income countries [Khanna et al. 2010], in pho-
tographing tasks [Noronha et al. 2011], or in task design [Retelny et al. 2014]. Ala-
garai Sampath et al. [2014] specifically focus on visual saliency and working memory
requirements as sub-properties of usability. Willett et al. [2012] show that the design
of the task interface has an impact on the learnability of a task. A good task interface
is further characterized by a high robustness against cheaters, that is, it is able to pro-
duce high-quality outputs even in the presence of cheaters [Eickhoff et al. 2012]. Hung
et al. [2013a] talk about “sensitivity to spammers”.
3.4. Incentives
Incentives affect the attractiveness of a task. As Hossfeld et al. [2014] point out, there
are several possible incentives targeting either the extrinsic (reward-driven) or in-
trinsic (interest-driven) motivation of workers. According to the authors, increasing
extrinsic motivation leads to faster task completion, while increasing intrinsic moti-
vation leads to higher quality. Many researchers have specifically studied the role of
monetary rewarding in crowdsourcing, e.g., on speed [Heer and Bostock 2010] or ex-
ecution efficiency [Singer and Mittal 2013], while Eickhoff et al. [2012] compared fun
and social prestige with monetary rewards as incentives.
3.5. Terms and Conditions
At a more abstract level, privacy has been identified as key property of tasks that deal
with personal data, e.g., using images that show people [Lasecki et al. 2013] or asking
workers to share their position [Boutsis and Kalogeraki 2016]. But also information
security and IP protection, that is, the protection of data and intellectual property
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(IP), are emerging quality attributes that affect a requester’s willingness to crowd-
source [Vukovic and Bartolini 2010]. A requester may, for example, share source code
or design documents, which are assets that contain IP; quality control mechanisms are
needed, e.g., to limit the access of workers to information, invite vetted workers only,
or sign nondisclosure agreements. As Amor et al. [2016] point out in their approach
to crowdsourced team competitions, the problem is not limited to requesters only and
may affect also workers. More generically, compliance means conformance with laws
and regulations [Wolfson and Lease 2011], but also with commonly accepted user poli-
cies [Wang et al. 2012] (e.g., no malicious crowdsourcing campaigns) or expected eth-
ical behaviors by the requester [Irani and Silberman 2013]. If a task is perceived as
non-compliant by workers, it is unlikely they will perform it.
3.6. Task Performance
The two most important attributes that have been studied to capture the execution
performance of a task are cost efficiency and time efficiency. The expected cost of a
task is easily determined by multiplying the reward by the number of task instances
worked on [Ambati et al. 2012; Livshits and Mytkowicz 2014]. However, since crowd-
sourcing a task is a generally non-deterministic process, cost efficiency, i.e., the cost per
completed task instance or the cost per correct output, has been studied more inten-
sively [Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich 2014; Rokicki et al. 2014]. The time efficiency can be
defined as the number of tasks completed in a given temporal interval [Eickhoff et al.
2012]; Lin et al. [2014] use the synonym “throughput,” Hung et al. [2013b] talk about
“computation time” for a given set of tasks. Kucherbaev et al. [2016b], for instance, aim
to improve the time efficiency by re-launching tasks at runtime. Cheng et al. [2015a]
compute task effort based on error rates and task completion times.
3.7. Requester Reputation
Irani and Silberman [2013] propose Turkopticon, a browser extension for Firefox and
Chrome that augments workers’ view of their task list in Amazon Mechanical Turk
with information other workers have provided about requesters. Turkopticon supports
assessing requesters by means of four attributes: Communicativity captures how re-
sponsive a requester is to communications or concerns raised by a worker. Generosity
tells how well a requester pays for the amount of time necessary to complete a task.
Fairness (also studied by Allahbakhsh et al. [2012]) tells how fair a requester is in ap-
proving or rejecting work submitted by workers. Promptness captures how promptly a
requester approves and pays work that has been successfully submitted.
3.8. Worker Profile
Kazai [2011b] study different worker profile attributes and personality traits in la-
beling tasks. Age, for instance, correlates with output accuracy, while gender does not
seem to have any influence on quality. Location does impact quality [Kazai 2011b;
Eickhoff et al. 2012; Kazai et al. 2012]. To assess the personality of workers, Kazai
[2011b] use the so-called Big Five inventory and study five personality traits (defini-
tions by John et al. [2008] and correlations from [Kazai 2011b]): Openness “describes
the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual’s mental and experi-
ential life;” it correlates with output accuracy. Conscientiousness “describes socially
prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior, such as
thinking before acting;” it positively correlates with output accuracy. Extraversion “im-
plies an energetic approach toward the social and material world and includes person-
ality traits such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality;” it
negatively correlates with output accuracy. Agreeableness “contrasts a prosocial and
communal orientation toward others with antagonism and includes traits such as al-
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truism, tender-mindedness, trust, and modesty;” it correlates with output accuracy.
Neuroticism “contrasts emotional stability and even-temperedness with negative emo-
tionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, sad, and tense;” it negatively correlates
with output accuracy. According to Kazai et al. [2012], personality characteristics are
useful to distinguish between good and better workers (less between good and bad).
Kobayashi et al. [2015] introduce a taxonomy of worker motivations, so that appropri-
ate incentives could be applied to persuade workers to contribute.
3.9. Worker Credentials
Credentials are all those qualifications or personal qualities that describe a worker’s
background; they can be self-declared (e.g., programming language skills) or issued by
official bodies (e.g., a MSc degree is issued by a university). Skills are abilities that tell
if a worker is able to perform a given task. Mavridis et al. [2016] propose a taxonomy
of skills; Difallah et al. [2013] use skills to match workers and tasks; Schall et al.
[2014] identify skills automatically. Certificates are documents that attest skills, such
as academic certificates or language certificates [Allahbakhsh et al. 2013].
3.10. Worker Experience
Badges are platform-provided certificates of performance, e.g., performing a certain
number of actions or tasks of a given type [Anderson et al. 2013]. Badges can be used
to select workers, but also to motivate them: badges are seen as “virtual trophies”
[Scekic et al. 2013a]. The reliability of a worker (often also called “accuracy” of the
worker) is commonly interpreted as the aggregated accuracy of the outputs produced
by the worker [Kazai 2011a], or the worker’s error rate in answering questions [Dalvi
et al. 2013; Demartini et al. 2013], or the acceptance rate of outputs delivered by work-
ers (e.g., Mechanical Turk). Sakurai et al. [2013] use the synonym “correctness” of a
worker as the probability of the worker being correct in labeling tasks. Raykar and
Yu [2011] assign scores to workers based on how reliable (not random) their answers
are. The reputation of a worker may take into account additional parameters, such as
the worker’s timeliness, the quality of the evaluators that assessed the worker, rela-
tions with other workers or requesters, the trust they express toward the worker, and
similar [Allahbakhsh et al. 2013]. That is, reputation also captures other community
members’ feedback about a worker’s activity in the system [De Alfaro et al. 2011].
3.11. Group Quality
The quality of groups of people, i.e., teams or the crowd as a whole, has been studied
mostly in terms of three different aspects. Availability, i.e., the presence in a platform
of enough workers or experts with the necessary skills for a given task, has been iden-
tified as an issue [Li et al. 2014]. Low availability usually leads to low quality of out-
puts [Ambati et al. 2012] or slow task execution [Li et al. 2014]. Next, diversity is the
property of a group to represent different types of people, skills, opinions, and similar.
Diversity is particularly important if representative samples of people are searched
for, e.g., in tasks that ask for opinions like the ox weight estimation experiment by
Surowiecki [2005] or polls [Livshits and Mytkowicz 2014]. Willett et al. [2012] specifi-
cally study how to increase the diversity of worker outputs. Finally, non-collusiveness
means that a group of agents does not share information or make joint decisions con-
trary to explicit or implicit social rules, which would result in an unfair advantage over
non-colluding agents or other interested parties [KhudaBukhsh et al. 2014].
4. QUALITY ASSESSMENT
Assigning concrete values to some of the attributes identified above can be a straight-
forward exercise, e.g., verifying if a worker has the necessary skills, certificates or
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Fig. 4: The quality assessment methods (on the right) emerged from literature; the
boxes with shadow represent generic techniques.
badges for a task can easily be done manually or automatically [Khazankin et al.
2012], or a task duration can easily be read from the log of the crowdsourcing system.
Assessing some other attributes may instead require the use of methods based on both
automated metrics as well as manual interventions by workers, the requester and/or
external experts. In the following, we focus on these more complex methods, and orga-
nize the discussion of the identified assessment methods into three major groups (the
techniques) in function of the actor in the assessment task, as illustrated in Figure 4:
— Individual: Given the human-oriented nature of crowdsourcing, it is natural to think
about involving humans also into assessment tasks and not only into work tasks.
Some assessment methods require the involvement of individuals (workers, experts,
or the requester), such as rating the accuracy of a given output or writing a review.
— Group: Some other assessment methods require the joint action of a group of people
(typically workers) for the formation of an assessment. For instance, voting requires
multiple participants to derive a ranking from which to select the best, or peer review
requires multiple peers to judge the work of a colleague.
— Computation-based: Some other assessment methods, instead, can be performed
without the involvement of humans, that is, automatically by a machine. Comparing
a set of outputs with a given ground truth can, for example, be carried out automati-
cally if suitable comparison operators are available.
We describe the respective methods next, following the order proposed in Figure 4.
We summarize the discussion tabularly in Appendix A.
4.1. Individual Assessments
4.1.1. Rating. Rating means assigning a value to an item chosen from a scale to ex-
press the perceived quality of the item. The scale defines the possible values to choose
from, e.g., unary scales allow one to express if an item is liked or not (used for instance
in Instagram), binary scales distinguish between two values (good/bad, true/false,
thumbs-up/thumbs-down, or similar), ordinal scales distinguish between discrete sets
of positive and negative values (typically 5, 7, or more), and continuous scales may
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allow an arbitrary number of values inside an interval ([0..1], [1..100], or similar). Rat-
ing is extensively used in crowdsourcing for quality assessment [Dalvi et al. 2013; Yu
et al. 2014], text similarity and understandability [Nguyen et al. 2014], worker con-
fidence [Sakurai et al. 2013], task quality (in CrowdFlower workers rate tasks after
completion), and requester reputation [Irani and Silberman 2013]. Hata et al. [2017]
have demonstrated that it is possible to predict workers’ long-term quality using just
a glimpse of their quality on the first five tasks as rated by the requester. Instead, to
counteract reputation inflation (too generous ratings, even if the rater would not want
to work with the rated worker/requester again), Gaikwad et al. [2016] conceived a rat-
ing system that rebounds the consequences of feedback back onto the raters, e.g., by
giving positively rated workers precedence in future tasks by the same requester.
4.1.2. Qualification test. A qualification test is a questionnaire that a worker may be
required to fill to obtain access to tasks that require prior knowledge or skills, e.g.,
language skills or acquaintance with a programming or modeling tool. Thanks to the
a-priori knowledge of the correct answers of the test, qualification tests can be eval-
uated automatically, grating the worker access to the task if a minimum threshold of
correct answers is reached. Qualification tests are widespread in crowdsourcing and
many crowdsourcing platforms provide support for qualification tests. Heer and Bo-
stock [2010] studied the effectiveness of qualification tests to assess workers in graph-
ical perception experiments; their findings show that qualification tests are indeed
able to discriminate unprepared workers, thereby increasing output quality.
4.1.3. Self-assessment. Self-assessment asks workers to assess the quality of their own
work after producing an output for a task. The practice stems from self-assessment in
learning [Boud 2013], where the aim is to help students reflect, learn, and connect
their work better with learning goals. Dow et al. [2012] studied the effectiveness of
self-assessment in the context of crowdsourced product reviews and found that tasks
with self-assessment produced better overall quality than tasks without. In addition,
they found that self-assessment helped workers improve the quality of their work over
time, in line with the expected learning effect. Self-assessment has also been used to
allow workers to state the confidence they have in their own work [Sakurai et al. 2013],
even suggesting workers to skip the task if they are not confident [Shah and Zhou
2015]. Shah and Zhou [2016] show noisy output examples to workers right before task
submission so they can resolve possible “silly” mistakes.
4.1.4. Personality tests. These are tests, typically questionnaires shown to workers,
that allow one to assess personality traits, that is, the actions, attitudes and behav-
iors individuals possess. For instance, Kazai [2011b] and Kazai et al. [2012] used
the so-called Big Five inventory [John and Srivastava 1999] to assess the personal-
ity traits openness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, and neuroticism;
the authors further identified a positive relation between the former three and output
accuracy and a negative relation between the latter two and output accuracy. Turkop-
ticon proposed by [Irani and Silberman 2013], instead, allows workers to explicitly rate
the communicativity, generosity, fairness, and promptness of requesters.
4.1.5. Referrals. Referrals express that someone has referred someone else for consid-
eration. They are well known in the domain of recruitment as a way to gather and
confirm expertise. SalesForce has indicated in their official blog that their main strat-
egy for recruitment is based on referrals (https://www.salesforce.com/blog/2015/01/
behind-scenes-salesforce-our-1-recruiting-secret.html). LinkedIn and ResearchGate
allow tagging skills to professionals. While referrals may not be a common instru-
ment to identify workers, they may well be used to find experts. Facebook and Twitter
enable recruiting workers by exploiting social connections [Bozzon et al. 2012].
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4.1.6. Expert review. An expert review is an assessment provided by a person that is
considered a domain expert by the requester. This expert is commonly not a member
of the crowd (whose work the expert assesses) and is typically directly assigned by the
requester to assessment tasks. Dow et al. [2012] describe a system that supports ex-
pert reviews providing workers with feedback on the quality of their work and show
that expert reviews help increase quality. Expert reviews are however costly; accord-
ingly, Hung et al. [2015] devised a method that optimizes the effort of experts through
reviews of only partial worker output sets while keeping quality high.
4.1.7. Usability check. Checking the usability of a task design helps identify issues
that may prevent workers from producing high-quality outputs. Specifically, usabil-
ity guidelines [Nielsen et al. 2002] can be used by the requester to check if a task
design follows known best practices or not. In the specific context of crowdsourcing,
Willett et al. [2012] have studied the usability of task UIs (understandability and
learnability) for data analysis and identified seven guidelines for data analysis tasks:
use feature-oriented prompts, provide good examples, include reference gathering sub-
tasks, include chart reading subtasks, include annotation subtasks, use pre-annotated
charts, and elicit explanations iteratively.
4.2. Group Assessments
4.2.1. Voting. Voting means expressing preference for one or more candidates (e.g.,
outputs) out of a group of candidates; aggregating the votes by multiple voters enables
the derivation of a list of candidates ranked by preference. Voting is very common in
crowdsourcing and used to make group decisions, e.g., 2 out of 3 majority decisions.
Kulkarni et al. [2012a], for instance, provide built-in support for voting in their col-
laborative crowdsourcing platform Turkomatic to validate the quality of task outputs.
Little et al. [2010b] instead equip their human programming framework Turkit with a
dedicated vote programming construct. Caragiannis et al. [2014] study different voting
techniques for crowdsourcing, while Sun and Dance [2012] also point out some pitfalls
of voting that should be taken into account when using the technique.
4.2.2. Group consensus. Group consensus is similar to voting, yet, the consensus refers
to ratings assigned to an item and less to a mere expression of preference. The purpose
is therefore not ranking multiple items (outputs) but identifying the most represen-
tative rating for one item. The method is frequently used to produce consensus labels
from crowd data. Sheshadri and Lease [2013] compare different techniques to assess
offline consensus and study, given multiple noisy labels (or ratings) per item, how to
infer the best consensus label. Zhang et al. [2015] specifically address the problem of
imbalanced labeling, i.e., labeling scenarios where there are many more positive than
negative cases (or viceversa). Eickhoff et al. [2012] use disagreement with the majority
consensus to identify workers considered cheaters (if they disagree more then 67% of
the times with the majority) and to derive a measure of robustness of a task. However,
consensus must not always be good: Kairam and Heer [2016], for instance, show that
there is also value in divergent outputs in crowdsourcing.
4.2.3. Output agreement. An output agreement is reached if two or more workers, given
the same input and performing the same task, produce a same or similar result as out-
put. Waggoner and Chen [2014], for instance, study the use of output agreement to
assess worker reliability and show that the technique is particularly useful to elicit
common knowledge (since the workers know that they are assessed based on the simi-
larity of their outputs with those by other workers). Huang and Fu [2013b] use output
agreement (they use the term peer consistency) to assess and motivate workers. Jaga-
bathula et al. [2014] instead assess workers based on output disagreement.
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4.2.4. Peer review. Peer review is similar to expert reviews, with the key difference
that it involves multiple peers in the assessment, in order to limit the bias of individual
peers and to elicit an as correct as possible assessment. It is typically used in those sit-
uations where experts would not be able to assess alone all outputs or items, such as in
the paper selection of scientific conferences, and represents a form of community-based
self-assessment. Crowdsourcing shares similar characteristics. Hansen et al. [2013],
for example, use peer review in the context of the FamilySearch Indexing project and
show that peer review is more efficient than using an arbitrator to resolve disagree-
ments among volunteers. Zhu et al. [2014] study different peer reviewing approaches
and show that the practice, next to representing an effective assessment instrument,
may also lead to performance increases of the reviewers (the workers themselves).
Peer review among workers has also been successfully used as reputation assessment
technique, producing better results than conventional techniques [Whiting et al. 2017].
4.2.5. Feedback aggregation. More sophisticated aggregation algorithms can be used
to integrate large amounts of feedbacks provided by either workers or requesters, in
order to obtain representative, concise assessment of quality attributes. Dalvi et al.
[2013], for instance, propose an eigenvector-based technique to estimate both worker
reliabilities and output qualities. Simple analytic models (e.g., sum, average, minimum
or maximum) are employed to calculate the rating scores of products. In weighted av-
eraging techniques, evaluations cast by users are weighted and their impact on final
rating scores is adjusted based on their corresponding weights. Davtyan et al. [2015]
leverage on content similarity to increase the quality of aggregated votes compared to
standard majority voting approaches. Allahbakhsh et al. [2012] use time and credit
of crowdsourcing tasks to weight pairwise evaluations between the community mem-
bers and also propose the concept of fairness of an evaluator while evaluating other
members. Iterative approaches calculate weights of evaluations and the result of ag-
gregation simultaneously but in several iterations. Iterative methods for social rating
have been pioneered in [Laureti et al. 2006; Yu et al. 2006]. Ignjatovic et al. [2008]
have proposed a reputation calculation model for online markets. Many more exam-
ples of aggregation algorithms exist [Hung et al. 2013b], with Joglekar et al. [2013]
also generating confidence intervals for aggregated values.
4.2.6. User study. Assessing the effectiveness of task UIs for which there do not yet
exist reference guidelines may require conducting task-specific usability studies. Wil-
lett et al. [2012], for instance, conducted user studies directly on Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk without direct contact between the experimenters and the workers. Khanna
et al. [2010], instead, organized controlled between-subjects study sessions with work-
ers, implemented dedicated image annotation tasks, and observed them in action to
assess the usability of tasks to low-income workers from countries like India. The key
general barriers identified were the complexity of instructions and UIs, difficult nav-
igation, and different cultural backgrounds. Alagarai Sampath et al. [2014] used eye
tracking to measure the working memory required by different task designs and their
visual saliency. This kind of user studies requires expert skills, for example, for the
conduct of interviews, the design of questionnaires or proper user observations.
4.3. Computation-based Assessments
4.3.1. Ground truth. The use of ground truth data (gold data, control questions) is a
common approach in crowdsourcing: by injecting into tasks questions whose answers
are known and formalized a priori (so that they can be checked automatically), it is pos-
sible to computationally estimate the aggregate accuracy of outputs and the trust in
workers. Ground truth evaluation is considered one of the most objective mechanisms
that can accurately measure the performance of workers [Huang and Fu 2013b]. The
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method is, for instance, natively supported by CrowdFlower. Eickhoff et al. [2012] pro-
vide an example of how to use ground truth data in gamification. Hara et al. [2013]
provide good examples of how to collect ground truth answers for image labeling with
wheelchair drivers (domain experts), while Oleson et al. [2011] argue that the genera-
tion of ground truth data is very difficult and costly and propose the use of “program-
matic gold” generated from previously collected correct data. Liu et al. [2013] propose a
method predicting an optimal number of ground truth labels to include. Le et al. [2010]
study the distribution logics of gold questions and conclude that a uniform distribution
produces best results in terms of worker precision, while El Maarry et al. [2015] show
that the biggest threat to ground truth evaluations are tasks with highly skewed an-
swer distributions. CAPTCHAs can be used to tell human workers and machines (e.g.,
robots) apart [Lasecki et al. 2014; Von Ahn et al. 2008].
4.3.2. Outlier analysis. Outliers are data points (e.g., worker performance or estima-
tions of a property) that significantly differ from the remaining data [Aggarwal 2013],
up to the point where they raise suspicion. Outliers may thus identify poorly perform-
ing workers, random answers, or similar. In [Rzeszotarski and Kittur 2012], the au-
thors show how they use CrowdScape to link behavioral worker information with out-
put properties and identify outliers visually (in charts). Jung and Lease [2011] use
outlier analysis to identify “noisy workers” in consensus labeling tasks. Marcus et al.
[2012] use outlier analysis to detect “spammers” in estimation tasks.
4.3.3. Fingerprinting. This method captures behavioral traces from workers during
task execution and uses them to predict quality, errors, and the likelihood of cheat-
ing. Behavioral traces are identified by logging user interactions with the task UI (at
the client side) and are expressed as interaction patterns that can be used at runtime
to monitor a worker’s conformance with the patterns. The method has been coined
by Rzeszotarski and Kittur [2011], demonstrating the effectiveness of the approach in
predicting output quality. Kazai and Zitouni [2016] even conclude that “accuracy al-
most doubles in some tasks with the use of gold behavior data.” As an extension, in
[Rzeszotarski and Kittur 2012] the authors propose CrowdScape, a system “that sup-
ports the human evaluation of complex crowd work through interactive visualization
and mixed initiative machine learning.”
4.3.4. Achievements. Verifying the achievement of predefined goals is a typical method
used to assign so-called badges (certificates, proves of achievement) to users. The
method resembles the merit badge concept of the Scout movement, where one must at-
tain all preceding badges before qualifying for the next one [Puah et al. 2011]. Achieve-
ments are used in crowdsourcing especially in the context of gamified crowdsourcing
tasks, such as exemplarily shown in [Massung et al. 2013], where badges are used in a
mobile data collection application to engage casual participants in pro-environmental
data collection. Badges were earned for activities such as using the application for five
days in a row or for rating a shop on the weekend.
4.3.5. Implicit feedback. Implicit feedback is a method of content-based feedback anal-
ysis. Feedback is implicit and extracted from the behavior of evaluators, rather than
from explicit feedback forms [De Alfaro et al. 2011]. For example, in WikiTrust [Adler
and De Alfaro 2007; Adler et al. 2011], a reputation management tool designed for
assessing Wikipedia users, the reputation of the user is built based on the changes a
user makes to the content. If a change is preserved by editors, the user gains repu-
tation otherwise he looses reputation. Lin et al. [2014] analyze implicit signals about
task preferences (e.g., the types of tasks that have been available and displayed and
the number of tasks workers have selected and completed) to recommend tasks to
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workers. Difallah et al. [2013] analyze workers’ personal interests expressed in social
networking sites (Facebook) to recommend tasks of likely interest in Mechanical Turk.
4.3.6. Association analysis. Associations among people are, for instance, the friend-of
relationships in Facebook, the recommendations in Freelancer, or the following rela-
tionship in Github. These relationships can be interpreted as expressions of trust or
prestige and analyzed accordingly. Already in 1977, [Freeman 1977] proposed the idea
of betweenness centrality as a measure of a node’s importance inside a graph, with
a special attention toward communicative potential. In the specific context of crowd-
sourcing, Rajasekharan et al. [2013] have, for example, extended the well-known Page
Rank algorithm [Page et al. 1999] with edge weights to compute what the authors call
a “community activity rank” for workers to eventually assess their reputation. This
kind of network analysis techniques is typically more suited to contest crowdsourcing
models, in which workers may know each other, and less to marketplaces where there
is no communication among workers.
4.3.7. Task execution log analysis. Given a log (trace) of worker interactions and task
completions, it is possible to analyze and/or mine the log for assessment purposes.
Fingerprinting uses log analysis to identify patterns; here the purpose is measuring
quality attributes. Kucherbaev et al. [2016b], for example, use linear regression to es-
timate task duration times at runtime to identify likely abandoned tasks, i.e., tasks
that will not be completed by their workers. Moshfeghi et al. [2016] use game theory to
classify workers based on task execution durations. Going beyond the estimation of in-
dividual quality attributes, Heymann and Garcia-Molina [2011] propose Turkalytics, a
full-fledged analytics platform for human computation able to provide real-time insight
into task properties like demographics of workers as well as location- and interaction-
specific properties. Huynh et al. [2013] reconstruct from logs a provenance network
that captures which worker saw/produced which data item in a set of interrelated
tasks; the network allows the authors to predict the trustworthiness of task outputs.
Jung et al. [2014] predict output quality by analyzing the time series of workers’ past
performance; KhudaBukhsh et al. [2014] do so to identify colluding workers.
4.3.8. Content analysis. It is also possible to automatically analyze a task’s description
and text labels to assess properties like task difficulty or trust in the requester. Artz
and Gil [2007], for instance, speak about “common sense” rules to make trust deci-
sions, e.g., do no trust prices below 50% of the average price. Difallah et al. [2013]
propose the use of different methods to assess task difficulty: comparison of task de-
scription with worker skills, entity extraction and comparison (based on Linked Open
Data), or content-oriented machine learning algorithms. Also [Yang et al. 2016] come
to the conclusion that “appearance and the language used in task description can accu-
rately predict task complexity.” Alagarai Sampath et al. [2014], instead, analyzed the
semantic similarity of input field labels and showed that too diverse labels may act as
distractors and that these can be used to predict accuracy.
4.3.9. Transfer learning. Transfer learning is the improvement of learning in a new task
through the transfer of knowledge from a related task that has already been learned
[Torrey and Shavlik 2009]. In crowdsourcing, transfer learning has been used to bor-
row knowledge from auxiliary historical tasks to improve the data veracity in a target
task, for instance, to infer the gender or reliability of workers using a hierarchical
Bayesian model [Mo et al. 2013]. Fang et al. [2014] use transfer learning to estimate
labelers’ expertise in data labeling tasks inside Mechanical Turk. Zhao et al. [2013], in-
stead, apply transfer learning in a cross-platform setting to transfer knowledge about
workers from Yahoo! Answers to a Twitter-based crowdsourcing system.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 51, No. 1, Article 7, Publication date: January 2018.
Quality Control in Crowdsourcing: A Survey 7:17
4.3.10. Collusion detection. Collusion detection aims to identify groups of colluding
workers, i.e., workers that share information to gain an advantage. KhudaBukhsh
et al. [2014] aim to identify non-adversarial collusions in ratings by detecting strong
inter-rater dependencies across tasks, as these diverge from the mean ratings. Marcus
et al. [2012] inject ground truth data to detect colluders. Allahbakhsh et al. [2014],
instead, compute a probability of collusion by analyzing past collaborations of workers
on same tasks and recommend likely non-colluding workers for team formation.
5. QUALITY ASSURANCE
The logical step after assessing quality is assuring quality, that is, putting into place
measures that help achieve quality – the more so if the assessment unveiled low qual-
ity for any of the attributes identified earlier. These measures, concretely, come in
the form of strategies and actions that a requester may implement. Some of these
strategies and actions are reactive if they react to clearly identified quality issues, e.g.,
filtering outputs upon the verification that some outputs do not meet given quality
thresholds. Other strategies and actions are instead proactive in that they do not need
a triggering event to be applied, e.g., following proper usability guidelines in the im-
plementation of a task does not require a prior verification of usability.
Before looking into the strategies and actions that have been used so far for quality
assurance in crowdsourcing, it is important to note that already assessing (measur-
ing) quality, especially if the object of the assessment are people, may have positive
side effects on quality. Most notably, reviewing has been shown to impact positively
the performance of both workers and reviewers [Zhu et al. 2014] and quality in gen-
eral [Hansen et al. 2013]. Rating has been used to increase the requesters awareness
of workers concerns and rights [Irani and Silberman 2013], but also rating the per-
formance of workers has similar positive side effects [Dow et al. 2012]. Many other
studies that provide similar evidence exist.
In the following, we do not further study these side effects of assessment. Instead, we
review the strategies and actions that specifically aim to improve quality as first-order
goal. Many of them require a prior quality assessment (e.g., filtering outputs requires
first assigning quality labels to them), others do not. We explain these aspects next,
and organize the discussion as illustrated in Figure 5. The identified strategies are:
— Improve data quality: The first and most intuitive strategy to approach low quality
in the output data is improving the quality of the data itself, where possible. Typical
actions range from cleansing inputs (crowdsourcing is not immune to the garbage-
in/garbage-out problem) to the iterative improvement of outputs.
— Select people: Another intuitive strategy is to identify workers that produce better
results. Doing so may require requesters to filter workers by their profiles, recom-
mending tasks to workers they think they will perform well or eliminating cheaters.
— Incentivize people: Incentivizing people means acting on the motivation that pushes
people to perform well (or not). There are two different sub-strategies that aim to
leverage on two different types of drivers [Rogstadius et al. 2011]:
— Extrinsic motivation depends on drivers that are determined from the outside of
a person’s own control. For example, workers may work harder if they see that it
results into a higher reward or even a bonus from the requester.
— Intrinsic motivation, instead, depends on drivers that are internal to the person
and does not depend on the desire for an external reward. For instance, workers
may be pushed to perform better if they can compare their performance with that
of other workers or if performing a task is entertaining (like in games).
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Fig. 5: The quality assurance strategies (boxes with shadow) and actions (boxes without
shadow) emerged from literature.
— Train people: Workers can also be instructed or trained to be prepared better for
specific tasks or domains and, hence, to perform better. Different approaches can be
followed, such as teaching workers or providing feedback to the work they submit.
— Improve task design: One reason for low quality may be the low usability or under-
standability of the user interface workers are provided with or the task description
and structure itself. Improving the design of a task may address related quality is-
sues, e.g., starting from input fields left empty.
— Control execution: Finally, some actions can be enacted during runtime, that is, dur-
ing the execution of a task while workers are already working and submitting out-
puts. For example, if it is evident at some point in time that not all workers will
produce outputs, it could be an idea to re-deploy some tasks.
Each of these strategies can be implemented using different, concrete actions. We
discuss these in the following and summarize the discussion in Appendix A tabularly.
5.1. Improve Data Quality
5.1.1. Cleanse data. The precondition of any process for good quality in output is good
quality in input. Khazankin et al. [2012] point out that a crowdsourcing platform can-
not be responsible for the output quality if the input data is inaccurate, and the re-
quester is responsible for the accuracy of the inputs. In fact, workers may be reluc-
tant to work on a task if they perceive the quality of the input (e.g., a blurred image)
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may impact their likelihood of getting the reward [Schulze et al. 2013]. To overcome
input quality problems, Bozzon et al. [2012], for instance, propose specific data pre-
processing steps to assemble, re-shape or filter input data in CrowdSearcher. Bigham
et al. [2010] use computer vision techniques to improve the quality of pictures taken
by blind people. Of course, data cleansing can be applied also to output data.
5.1.2. Aggregate outputs. In the book “The Wisdom of Crowds,” Surowiecki [2005]
has shown with his ox weight guessing experiment that averaging (aggregating) the
guesses of multiple people can produce an accurate overall guess. That is, adding re-
dundancy (multiple workers working on a same task) and aggregating outputs can
increase the quality of outputs, of course, at the cost of paying more workers. The
responses of workers can also be weighted based on their reliability to increase the
influence of responses given by trusted and skilled workers [Aydin et al. 2014]. Par-
ticular attention is payed by literature to the aggregation of outputs in classification
tasks [Ho et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2016; Ok et al. 2016; Liu and Wang 2012], including
Boolean ones [De Alfaro et al. 2015; Ukkonen et al. 2015]
5.1.3. Filter outputs. The assessment methods discussed in the previous section aim to
tell apart “good” from “bad” items (outputs, workers, requesters, etc.). The correspond-
ing assurance action that aims to improve quality is filtering out the bad items, so as
to keep only the good ones. Filtering is very prominent in crowdsourcing. For instance,
[Dow et al. 2012] filter outputs based on self- and expert reviews, Hansen et al. [2013]
filter outputs based on output agreements (with/without arbitration) and peer review,
Rao et al. [2013] use majority votes to filter outputs, others use ground truth compar-
isons [Marcus et al. 2012], and so on. Jung and Lease [2012] filter workers based on
their past performance. As an extension of the pure filtering of outputs, these may
further be cleaned of possible biases by workers, e.g., through active learning [Zhuang
and Young 2015; Wauthier and Jordan 2011].
5.1.4. Iterative improvement. Instead of asking one worker to evaluate the work of an-
other worker (assessment), it is also possible to ask the former to directly improve
the work of the latter (assurance). Multiple iterations of improvement are of course
possible. Little et al. [2010b], for example, let workers iterate over writing tasks to
incrementally improve a text written collaboratively by the crowd, while in [Little
et al. 2010a] they apply iterative improvement to decipher blurred text. In Turkomatic
[Kulkarni et al. 2012a], workers can iteratively split tasks down till they are manage-
able, thereby reducing the complexity of the overall task.
5.2. Select People
5.2.1. Filter workers. Similar to outputs, a requester may also filter workers to make
sure they have the necessary skills, preparation, attitude, or similar for a task. This fil-
tering can, for instance, be based on the worker profiles and look at skills and expertise
[Allahbakhsh et al. 2013; Zhao et al. 2013], badges (CrowdFlower), or demographics
(as a proxy for skills) [Kazai et al. 2012]. Kazai et al. [2012] filter workers also by per-
sonality, while Li et al. [2014] look at worker reliability, and Allahbakhsh et al. [2012]
look at the reputation of workers inside the crowdsourcing platform. Hara et al. [2013]
use statistical filtering (outlier elimination) to discard low-quality workers. Abraham
et al. [2016], too, use reputation to filter workers, but also propose the use of adaptive
stopping rules to lower the cost of tasks. Nushi et al. [2015] specifically filter workers
to increase crowd diversity.
5.2.2. Reject workers. Instead of selecting good workers, it is also possible to skim out
(reject) non-fitting, fake, malicious or colluding workers, often also called attackers
or cheaters. Typical adversarial techniques are randomly posting answers, artificially
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generating answers, or duplicating them from other sources [Difallah et al. 2012] as
well as collaborations among workers aimed at tricking the system (collusions). Bots
or software agents can be eliminated using CAPTCHAs [Lasecki et al. 2014]. Difal-
lah et al. [2012] use start time and end time to predict if a given result comes from
a cheater or not. It is important to properly tune the applied thresholds to detect
cheaters without affecting good workers [Bozzon et al. 2013]. Marcus et al. [2012] com-
pare ground truth data with task outputs to prevent coordinated attacks from workers.
Allahbakhsh et al. [2014] identify collusions from past collaborations of workers.
5.2.3. Assign workers. Instead of waiting for tasks to be pulled by random workers, it
may be more effective to pro-actively push tasks to cherry-picked workers. If both the
skills required by a task and the ones possessed by workers are defined, tasks can
be automatically assigned. For example, Mobileworks uses priority queues to assign
tasks [Kulkarni et al. 2012b]. Allahbakhsh et al. [2013] assign stronger workers to
harder tasks, while Roy et al. [2015] specifically focus on knowledge-intensive tasks
and show the benefits of maintaining a pre-computed index for efficient worker-to-
task assignment. Difallah et al. [2013] show that matches can also be derived from
social network activity, while Kulkarni et al. [2014] identify experts in social networks
and recruit them. If no skills regarding tasks and workers are given, a two-phase
exploration-exploitation assignment algorithm can be applied [Ho and Vaughan 2012].
More dynamic approaches may even learn task assignment policies at runtime, e.g., to
maximize the expected information gain [Kobren et al. 2015].
5.2.4. Recommend tasks. Instead of assigning tasks to workers, identified task-worker
matches can also be used to provide workers with recommendations of tasks they very
likely are interested in. This still allows workers to decide to work on a recommended
task or not. A recommendation can be delivered, for example, as an email notification
when a new task is posted on a platform [Bernstein et al. 2012], and subscriptions can
be created using www.turkalert.com. Recommendations can be based on a worker’s
task browsing history [Yuen et al. 2015], or they may take into account implicit nega-
tive feedback [Lin et al. 2014].
5.2.5. Promote tasks. With promoting a task we refer to all those actions that aim to
enlarge the worker basis for tasks, even outside crowdsourcing platforms. More work-
ers means more diversity, tasks completed, speed, and similar. Hu et al. [2012], for
instance, place widgets with integrated tasks on third-party services, such as the In-
ternational Children’s Digital Library. Kulkarni et al. [2012b] ask workers to recruit
others for a given task, others incentivize this kind of recruitment [Nath et al. 2012].
Also posting task information on worker community sites, such as the “HITsWorth-
TurkingFor” reddit page, can increase the task’s workforce. A more direct way of pro-
moting tasks is to invite people, e.g., experts from online communities, to participate
in tasks [Oosterman and Houben 2016].
5.2.6. Situated crowdsourcing. This means bringing tasks to the workers physically,
where it is more likely to encounter target workers, instead of waiting for them to join
a crowdsourcing platform and to actively look for work. For instance, dedicated kiosks
installed next to a library entrance [Hosio et al. 2014], vending machines installed
in front of the major lecture hall in a CS building [Heimerl et al. 2012], and public
displays [Niforatos et al. 2016] have been used for the crowdsourcing of small tasks.
Similarly, Vaish et al. [2014] ask mobile phone users for micro-contributions each time
they unlock their phone, exploiting the common habit of turning to the mobile phone
in spare moments.
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5.2.7. Recruit teams. Team-based recruitment approaches overcome the problem of re-
cruiting enough workers by finding and recruiting teams of workers who have profiles
matching the task requirements. Forming and recruiting teams is possible in smaller
communities such as communities that are specialized in specific services like IT tech-
nical or business services [Vukovic et al. 2010; Schall et al. 2012]. Retelny et al. [2014]
identify experts in the crowd and organize them into teams to solve complex tasks.
Li et al. [2014] run trial tasks to discover groups of workers producing higher quality
than average and target them for future work on the same task. Rokicki et al. [2015]
study different team competition designs to improve performance.
5.3. Improve Extrinsic Motivation
5.3.1. Tailor rewards. One of the key properties of each task is the reward. Choosing
the right form and/or amount of the reward is thus of utmost importance for the suc-
cess of a crowdsourced task. Faradani et al. [2011] and Ho et al. [2015] show that it
is important to tweak the amount of the reward properly, so as to obtain good results.
Radanovic and Faltings [2016] demonstrate the effectiveness of dynamically adjusting
payments based on output quality. Mao et al. [2013] study the effectiveness of differ-
ent rewarding schemas, such as volunteering, pay per time, pay per task, pay per each
data unit in a task, and show that workers are sensitive to the schemas. Along the
same line, Ikeda and Bernstein [2016] show that paying tasks in bulks may increase
the task completion rate, while coupons or material goods decrease participation. Sce-
kic et al. [2013a] also discuss deferred compensation and relative evaluation as well
as team-based compensation schemas. Sakurai et al. [2013] propose reward strate-
gies based on worker performance. Singer and Mittal [2013] study how to maximize
the amount of tasks completed with a given budget using different pricing strategies.
Rokicki et al. [2014] study gambling-based rewarding strategies. Of course, also non-
monetary rewards, such as badges, can be are seen as “virtual trophies” [Scekic et al.
2013a] that motivate workers, yet Kobren et al. [2015] also show that these kinds of
objectives must be designed carefully otherwise they may produce detrimental effects.
5.3.2. Pay bonus. A bonus is an additional, discretionary reward for good performance
added to the base reward of a task. Bonuses are typically granted for the achieve-
ment of predefined goals or for reaching the threshold of key performance indicators
(KPIs) [Scekic et al. 2013a]. Difallah et al. [2014] grant bonuses in response to workers
meeting given milestones. Yin et al. [2014] top-up the base reward for tasks if workers
provide correct answers and if they react in less than 1 second. Yu et al. [2014] give
credits as base reward, bonuses of 5 cents for additional tasks performed and of 10 US
dollars for earning most credits (assigned every other month). Faltings et al. [2014]
show that game-theoretic bonus schemas can also help eliminate worker bias, next to
incentivizing them to work better.
5.3.3. Promote workers. Promoting a worker means raising the worker to a higher po-
sition compared to his/her current one or compared to others. Promotions are particu-
larly suitable to those environments that are characterized by a long-lasting engage-
ment of workers, e.g., crowdsourcing environment with deferred payment schemas. It
has been shown that the prospect of a promotion, e.g., to get higher rewards or to
obtain access to new types of tasks, increases motivation, also over longer periods of
time [Scekic et al. 2013a]. For example, Dow et al. [2012] promote workers from con-
tent producers to feedback providers (assessors), while Scekic et al. [2013b], next to
promotions, also introduce the idea of punishments.
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5.4. Improve Intrinsic Motivation
5.4.1. Share purpose. Tasks that have a purpose that goes beyond the individual
micro-task, that workers understand and can identify with can help attract crowds
to perform tasks with higher motivation, also for free by volunteering [Dontcheva
et al. 2014]. Examples of crowdsourcing initiatives driven by this sense of purpose
are Zoouniverse (www.zooniverse.org) described in [Mao et al. 2013] or Wikipedia. As
workers contribute for the purpose, rather than for the monetary reward (if any), these
tasks are typically less attractive to spammers or adversarial workers. Kobayashi et al.
[2015] show that tasks with an explicit social purpose may help attract especially se-
nior citizens as workers. Kaufman et al. [2016] identified that people tend to contribute
more to volunteering tasks with few other contributors involved.
5.4.2. Self-monitoring. Enabling workers to compare their performance with that of
other workers (self-assessment) can switch workers into a competition mode that
pushes them to perform better [Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich 2014; Scekic et al. 2013a].
Most crowdsourcing platforms today already assign workers a reliability or perfor-
mance rating visible in the platform. Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich [2014] study the bene-
fits of displaying scores to workers individually, overall crowd performance, and leader-
boards with complete or partial rankings of workers. Leaderboards have been used
extensively so far [Rokicki et al. 2014; Dontcheva et al. 2014; Preist et al. 2014].
5.4.3. Social transparency. Social transparency means sharing identity (e.g., real name,
persistent identity in applications), content (e.g., comments), actions (e.g., tasks per-
formed, endorsements) among workers [Huang and Fu 2013a]. Through transparency,
workers build trust and bond with their co-workers and the requester and define stan-
dards and quality control mechanisms that eventually may improve performance and
output quality [Huang and Fu 2013a; Vie´gas et al. 2007]. According to Yu et al. [2014],
maintaining good relationships between workers helps also to attract more workers.
In collaborative crowdsourcing scenarios, social pressure among workers (e.g., asking
to stay) can have positive impacts on performance [Feyisetan and Simperl 2016].
5.4.4. Gamify task. Luis von Ahn introduced Games With A Purpose, where partici-
pants perform tasks in games for joy and entertainment, rather than financial reward
[Ahn 2006]. Krause and Kizilcec [2015] found that for complex tasks workers produce
better results in a gamified than in a paid condition; for simple tasks there was no dif-
ference. Designing tasks that induce curiosity is a task-agnostic strategy to improve
worker retention [Law et al. 2016]. Feyisetan et al. [2015] propose a model to predict
optimal combinations of financial and gamified incentives.
5.5. Train People
5.5.1. Prime workers. Priming uses implicit mechanisms to induce observable changes
in behavior that are usually outside of the conscious awareness of the primed person
[Morris et al. 2012]. Images, text, music and videos can be used to induce positive
emotions in workers that in turn result in a positive effect on task performance, e.g.,
an image of a laughing child may induce workers to perform better [Morris et al. 2012].
Alagarai Sampath et al. [2014] use priming to help workers remember information.
Faltings et al. [2014] study the effectiveness of priming on task performance.
5.5.2. Teach workers. Teaching means providing workers with suitable instructions in
order to enable them to perform tasks. Doroudi et al. [2016] show that providing expert
examples and letting workers validate others’ contributions are effective ways of teach-
ing. Singla et al. [2014] use an algorithm to select expert examples to show to users.
To many workers, gaining or improving skills is a motivation per se. This motivation
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can be enforced by in-person training like in Samasource (http://www.samasource.org/)
or Mobileworks (https://www.mobileworks.com/) or through interactive tutorials, such
as the ones described by Dontcheva et al. [2014]. Also, designing tasks in a way that
helps workers learn improves output quality [Yu et al. 2014].
5.5.3. Provide feedback. Workers getting feedback from requesters about their perfor-
mance provide results of better quality [Dow et al. 2012]. The process of reviewing
others’ work itself improves quality [Yu et al. 2014] and helps workers gain new skills
[Zhu et al. 2014]. Kulkarni et al. [2012a] show how requester feedback is important to
handle complex work in their Turkomatic platform.
5.5.4. Team work. Team working means working together on a same task, where “to-
gether” means by interacting with each other (we don’t consider it a team work if sev-
eral workers jointly label a set of images without any inter-personal communication).
Kittur [2010], for instance, use team work for the translation of a poem, which requires
negotiation between workers. Andre´ et al. [2014] provide workers with a shared, col-
laborative editing space for creative writing tasks. Dorn et al. [2012] propose flexible
workflows to organize teams of collaborating workers.
5.6. Improve Task Design
5.6.1. Lower complexity. One of the challenges in crowdsourcing is identifying the right
granularity, that is, complexity, for tasks. As Rogstadius et al. [2011] show, the ac-
curacy of outputs typically decreases with increasing task complexity. From a design
perspective, it is further important to implement tasks in a way that limits cognitive
complexity; for instance, comparing two objects is easier than identifying features of
individual objects [Anderton et al. 2013]. While the simplification of more complex
tasks introduces longer completion times, it leads to higher quality; simpler tasks suit
better if workers perform with interruptions [Cheng et al. 2015b].
5.6.2. Decompose task. Another way to lower the complexity of a task is to decom-
pose it into sub-tasks. Kittur et al. [2011] propose a partition-map-reduce approach
in CrowdForge, where work is split into a set of sub-tasks executed in parallel and
merged back later. Kulkarni et al. [2012a] propose a price-divide-solve algorithm in
Turkomatic, where workers themselves can decide whether to work on a task them-
selves or rather split it into sub-tasks and then merge the outputs produced by others.
5.6.3. Separate duties. Separation of duties is a design pattern lent from the business
practice that requires multiple people to be involved in a decision, so as to prevent
fraud or errors. Organizing work in such a way that workers have only one single task
to perform may further lead to higher quality of outputs. Bernstein et al. [2010], for
instance, propose a find-fix-verify approach for text proofreading, where some workers
identify errors in a text (find), some others correct identified errors (fix), and others
again check if there are no further mistakes left (verify). In [Kulkarni et al. 2012a],
workers decide if they prefer to split a task or to perform it.
5.6.4. Validate worker inputs. Validating worker inputs means checking that the values
provided by the workers through the form fields in the task UI comply with formal
requirements, e.g., no empty fields or only correct email addresses. This is a common
design guideline that is, however, often not followed by requesters, eventually leading
to low output quality. In Deluge [Bragg et al. 2013] tasks are designed in such a way
that workers must select at least one item from a list of available options. On Crowd-
Flower and AskSheet [Quinn and Bederson 2014], the requester can select allowed
formats (e.g., an email, US address, phone number or even a custom regular expres-
sion) for fields in the task form and identify mandatory and optional input fields.
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5.6.5. Improve usability. Just like for any kind of software, it is important that task
UIs are usable and properly follow common usability guidelines [Nielsen et al. 2002;
Khanna et al. 2010]. Well-designed tasks lead to higher quality of the outputs [Kazai
2011a]. For instance, it is a good practice to provide workers with clear and meaningful
examples of good work [Willett et al. 2012]. Highlighting input fields adequately and
placing them closer to the relevant content reduces search time and working memory
load [Alagarai Sampath et al. 2014]. Designing tasks in a way that it takes the same
or less time to perform a task properly rather than to cheat also helps avoid spammers
[Kittur et al. 2008].
5.6.6. Prompt for rationale. Collecting rationales from workers for their own work is a
good way to encourage workers to be more conscious and to collect verifiable results, es-
pecially for subjective tasks [McDonnell et al. 2016]. Drapeau et al. [2016] suggest that
allowing workers to adjust their work based on rationales provided by other workers
may improve quality further.
5.6.7. Introduce breaks. Performing long sequences of monotonous tasks can be down-
ing for workers. Dai et al. [2015] show that introducing occasional breaks, such as
playing games or reading a comic, may help increase workers’ retention.
5.6.8. Embrace error. There are classes of tasks where fast completion has higher pri-
ority than the quality of each individual worker’s judgment. A way to approach such
tasks is to design them encouraging workers to perform very fast, accepting and
even embracing possible errors, which can be later rectified through suitable post-
processing [Krishna et al. 2016].
5.7. Control Execution
5.7.1. Reserve workers. Maintaining a pool of workers ready to work on a task is an
effective approach to minimize waiting time that is especially useful if results are to
be collected fast, e.g., in real-time. For instance, it is possible to pay workers for the
time they spend waiting for tasks [Bernstein et al. 2012]. To make sure workers stay
focused during the waiting time they can be asked to play a game [Lasecki et al. 2013].
In case of requesters launching tasks only occasionally, it can be financially efficient to
maintain a single pool of workers for multiple requesters. Bigham et al. [2010] adopt
this approach and notify workers of the retainment pool when a new task is published.
5.7.2. Flood task list. Chilton et al. [2010] have shown that workers tend to give more
attention to newer tasks when looking for tasks to work for. If a task does not appear
on the top of the first page of the task list or even goes to the second page of the listing,
the attention devoted to it drops dramatically. To keep the attention of workers high,
Bernstein et al. [2012] have shown that repeatedly posting tasks (flooding) inside a
crowdsourcing platform indeed increases the task’s visibility and attractiveness.
5.7.3. Dynamically instantiate tasks. Monitoring the work of the crowd can allow the re-
quester to identify quality issues while a task is still in execution, e.g., workers not
completing their work or doing so with too low level of quality. Kucherbaev et al.
[2016b] show how dynamic re-launching of tasks, that are automatically identified
as abandoned, helps to lower overall task execution times in exchange of a small cost
overhead. Bozzon et al. [2013] support the dynamic re-planning of task deployments.
Yan et al. [2011] study how to actively learn to choose workers to minimize speed
and/or time. Many study how to maximize quality by dynamically instantiating and
assigning work under budget constraints [Li et al. 2016; Tran-Thanh et al. 2015; Chen
et al. 2013; Karger et al. 2011; Karger et al. 2014]. Bansal et al. [2016] use content
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similarity to dynamically identify data items to label and propagate labels to similar
items.
5.7.4. Control task order. If a group of tasks presents interdependencies where the out-
put of one task affects the usefulness of another task, controlling the order of task
deployment can help avoid useless extra costs. For instance, in a set of comparison
tasks if a = b and b 6= c, then there is no reason to compare also a and c [Vesdapunt
et al. 2014]. Marcus et al. [2012] show how to use selectivity estimations used in tra-
ditional databases for query optimization to order tasks and reduce them in number.
Lasecki et al. [2015] and Newell and Ruths [2016] suggest to group tasks with related
content into batches, because tasks that have already been completed by a worker
affect his/her focus in subsequent tasks, and the too high a diversity of task content
inside a same batch of tasks leads to interruptions due to context switch. Yet, Eickhoff
and de Vries [2013] also show that large batches tend to attract more cheaters than
small batches. Difallah et al. [2016] address context switch and minimize latency using
scheduling techniques guaranteeing that all tasks get equal attention.
5.7.5. Inter-task coordination. More complex tasks, especially composite tasks that in-
volve multiple different sub-tasks, can be managed by automating the respective
crowdsourcing workflow. Bozzon et al. [2013] propose an event-condition-action ap-
proach to organize tasks. Kucherbaev et al. [2016a] overview workflow automation in-
struments tailored to crowdsourcing, e.g. Turkit [Little et al. 2010b] supporting script-
ing and CrowdLang [Minder and Bernstein 2012] supporting visual modeling.
6. ANALYSIS OF STATE-OF-THE-ART CROWDSOURCING PLATFORMS
In the following, we discuss and compare a selection of state-of-the-art crowdsourcing
platforms with the help of the taxonomy introduced in this article. We thus specifi-
cally look at the quality model/attributes, the assessment methods, and the assurance
actions supported by the approaches.
The crowdsourcing platforms we analyze represent a selection of heterogeneous in-
struments drawn from both industrial systems and academic research prototypes. The
selection is by no means intended to be complete, nor does it represent a list of “most
popular” instruments. It is rather the result of an internal discussion among the au-
thors of this article of the platforms we found in our research, the platforms we looked
at in the analysis, and the platforms we personally worked with over the last years.
The goal of the selection was to provide a varied picture of the platforms that charac-
terize today’s crowdsourcing landscape.
The result of this discussion is the selection of the following 14 platforms: Me-
chanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com), one of the first crowdsourcing platforms for
paid micro-tasks; CrowdFlower (http://www.crowdflower.com), a meta-platform for
micro-tasks that acts as proxy toward other platforms; MobileWorks (http://www.
mobileworks.com), a platform with an ethical mission that pays workers hourly wages;
Crowdcrafting (http://crowdcrafting.org), which targets scientists and non-paid volun-
teers; Turkit [Little et al. 2010c], a JavaScript-based language for the programmatic
coordination and deployment of tasks on Mechanical Turk; Jabberwocky [Ahmad et al.
2011], a MapReduce-based human computation framework with an own programming
language; CrowdWeaver [Kittur et al. 2012], a model-based tool with a proprietary
notation and crowdsourcing-specific constructs; AskSheet [Quinn and Bederson 2014],
a Google Spreadsheet extension with functions for the integration of crowdsourcing
tasks; Turkomatic [Kulkarni et al. 2012a], a crowdsourcing tool that delegates not
only work to the crowd but also task management operations (e.g., splitting tasks);
CrowdForge [Kittur et al. 2011], a crowdsourcing framework similar to Turkomatic
that follows the Partition-Map-Reduce approach; Upwork (https://www.upwork.com/),
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an auction-based platform for freelancers in different domains (e.g., software develop-
ment or writing); 99designs (http://99designs.it/), a contest-based platform for graphi-
cal design freelancers; Topcoder (https://www.topcoder.com/), a contest-based platform
for software developers and designers; Innocentive (http://www.innocentive.com/), a
platform for the crowdsourcing of innovation challenges.
We use the taxonomy to classify each of these platforms or tools individually in Ta-
ble I and to summarize the supported quality attributes, assessment methods and
assurance actions from a qualitative point of view. Figures 6–8 provide a quantitative
summary of the table in the form of heat maps that color each of the leaves (quality
attributes, assessment methods and assurance actions, respectively) of the Figures 3–
5 with a different intensity according to how many of the platforms/tools support the
respective feature; possible values thus range from 0 (white) to 14 (dark green). We
discuss the findings in the following subsections.
Table I: Crowdsourcing platforms comparison by supported quality model/attributes,
assessment methods and assurance actions.
Quality attributes Assessment Assurance
M
T
ur
k
data (accuracy), task incentives
(extrinsic), task terms and
conditions (privacy), task
performance (cost efficiency, time
efficiency), worker profile
(location), worker credentials
(skills), worker experience (badges,
reliability)
rating (reliability),
qualification tests (skills),
ground truth questions
(accuracy), rating-based
achievements (badges)
filter workers by reliability (acceptance
rate, tasks completed), by badges (domain
specific master skill) or location; assign
workers; reject workers; tailor rewards; pay
bonus; provide feedback to workers;
validate worker inputs; prompt for
rationale
C
ro
w
dF
lo
w
er
data (accuracy, timeliness), task
description (clarity, complexity),
task incentives (extrinsic), task
terms and conditions (privacy,
information security), task
performance (cost efficiency, time
efficiency), worker profile
(location), worker credentials
(skills), worker experience (badges,
reliability)
rating (reliability),
qualification tests (skills),
output agreement
(accuracy, reliability),
feedback aggregation
(task satisfaction survey
on clarity, complexity,
incentives), ground truth
questions (accuracy),
rating-based
achievements (badges),
execution log analysis
(accuracy, timeliness)
aggregate outputs (consistency, accuracy),
filter workers (by country, by distribution
channel, by NDA), badges (obtainable
level), skills (language), reject workers,
tailor rewards; pay bonus, provide feedback,
validate worker inputs, prompt for
rationale, control task order (select an order
in which tasks are deployed), inter-task
coordination (Crowdflower workflow plugin)
M
ob
il
eW
or
ks
data (accuracy, timeliness), task
incentives (extrinsic), task terms
and conditions (privacy), worker
profile (age, gender, location),
worker credentials (skills), worker
experiences (badges, reliability),
group (availability)
rating (reliability),
qualification tests (skills),
expert review (accuracy
and reliability of group
members), peer review
(accuracy), ground truth
(accuracy)
filter workers, reject workers, assign
workers, promote tasks (workers involve
referrals), recruit teams (recruit local small
teams, interview via Skype), tailor rewards,
pay bonus, promote workers to team
leaders, teach workers, provide feedback,
teamwork, validate worker inputs, prompt
for rationale, control task order
C
ro
w
dC
ra
ft
in
g
intrinsic incentives
(citizenscience), task terms and
conditions (privacy), task
performance (time efficiency),
worker profile (location, personal
details)
execution log analysis
(time efficiency)
promote tasks (featuring on the platform),
share purpose (tasks from high impact
scientific fields), self-monitoring
(contributions leaderboard), social
transparency (optional public worker
profiles), prompt for rationale, control task
order (tasks order priority, scheduling -
depth first, breadth first, random)
T
ur
K
it
data (accuracy, timeliness),
extrinsic incentives (reward) voting (accuracy)
filter outputs, iterative improvement, tailor
rewards, separate duties (explicit voting
tasks), dyn. instantiate tasks (as a part of
iterative improvement), control task order
(via automatic workflow), inter-task
coordination (programmatically using
JavaScript-like scripts)
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Quality attributes Assessment Assurance
Ja
bb
er
w
oc
ky data (accuracy), extrinsic
incentives (reward), worker profile
(age, gender, location, custom
attributes), credentials (skills,
certificates)
rating (accuracy), voting
(accuracy)
aggregate outputs, filter outputs, iterative
improvement, filter workers (rich profiles),
assign workers, tailor rewards, inter-task
coordination (Dog programs)
C
ro
w
dW
ea
ve
r
data (accuracy, timeliness),
extrinsic incentives (reward), task
performance (cost efficiency, time
efficiency)
voting (accuracy), output
agreement (accuracy),
ground truth (accuracy)
cleanse data (divide, permute tasks),
inter-task coordination (supports runtime
workflow edits)
A
sk
Sh
ee
t
data (accuracy), extrinsic
incentives (reward), task
performance (cost efficiency)
rating (accuracy), voting
(accuracy)
cleanse data (facilitated through
spreadsheet paradigm), aggregate outputs
(spreadsheet formulas), filter outputs
(spreadsheet formulas, worker vote), tailor
rewards, validate worker inputs (enforce
predefined bounds and types), dyn.
instantiate tasks (launching extra
instances until a certain threshold is
reached), control task order (prioritization),
inter-task coordination (using referral links
in formulas)
T
ur
ko
m
at
ic
data (accuracy), extrinsic
incentives (reward), task
description (complexity)
voting (accuracy)
aggregate outputs (via “merging” tasks),
filter outputs (via “voting” tasks), tailor
rewards, teamwork (via runtime workflow
edits), decompose task (via “subdivision”
tasks), inter-task coordination (emerges at
runtime following the price-divide-solve
algorithm)
C
ro
w
dF
or
ge
data (accuracy), extrinsic
incentives (reward), task
description (complexity)
voting (accuracy)
aggregate outputs (via “reduce” step), filter
outputs (via “voting” tasks), decompose task
(via dynamic partitioning), inter-task
coordination (according to
partition-map-reduce approach with
possible nesting)
U
pw
or
k
data (accuracy), extrinsic
incentives (reward), task terms
and conditions (IP), task
performance (cost efficiency),
requester (reputation), worker
profile (location), worker
credentials (skills, certificates,
portfolio), experiences (badges,
reliability)
rating (accuracy),
qualification test (skills),
referrals (reliability),
expert review (accuracy),
achievements (badges),
execution log analysis
(monitoring of worked
hours)
filter workers (also via interviews), reject
workers (disputes), assign workers (invite
to work), recruit teams, tailor rewards (per
hour vs. fixed price), pay bonus, social
transparency, provide feedback, teamwork,
prompt for rationale
99
de
si
gn
s data (accuracy, timeliness),
extrinsic incentives (reward), task
terms and conditions (IP), worker
profile (location), worker
credentials (skills), worker
experiences (badges, reliability)
rating (accuracy,
reliability), referrals
(reliability), achievements
(badges)
filter outputs (based on competition), filter
workers (profile, experience), assign
workers (invite to work), tailor rewards
(predefined plans or direct negotiation),
self-monitoring (submissions of others are
optionally visible), social transparency
(workers can use real identities and build
professional profiles), provide feedback,
teamwork, prompt for rationale
To
pc
od
er
data (accuracy, timeliness),
extrinsic incentives (reward), task
terms and conditions (IP,
information security), worker
profile (location), worker
credentials (skills), experiences
(badges, reliability, custom
performance metrics)
rating (accuracy), peer
review (called community
review), achievements
(badges), content analysis
(unit tests on submitted
code)
filter outputs (test-based or community
review), tailor rewards, pay bonus,
self-monitoring (leaderboard), social
transparency (workers can link social
network profiles with their identities),
prompt for rationale
In
no
ce
nt
iv
e data (accuracy), extrinsic
incentives (reward), task terms
and conditions (IP, compliance),
worker profile (location, rich
profile), worker credentials (skills,
certificates)
rating (accuracy), expert
review (accuracy)
filter outputs (proposals filtered manually),
recommend tasks (based on workers skills
and interests), tailor rewards, prompt for
rationale
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 51, No. 1, Article 7, Publication date: January 2018.
7:28 F. Daniel et al.
6.1. Quality Model
Figure 6 illustrates how many of the studied platforms support each of the attributes
of the quality model derived in this article. Immediately, it is evident that the core con-
cern almost all platforms (13 out of 14) have is the accuracy of the outputs produced by
the crowd. This is not surprising, as high quality outputs are one of the key drivers of
crowdsourcing in the first place (next to cost and time). In order to allow the requester
to tweak quality, most platforms allow the requester to fine-tune the extrinsic incen-
tives (rewards) given for tasks (13/14), to select workers based on age (2/14), gender
(2/14), location (9/14), skills (8/14). In addition, approximately half of the platforms
also implement proper reliability tracking (6/14) or reputation management systems
(6/14) for worker selection.
Quality 
Model
User interface
Data
Complexity
Performance
Accuracy
Consistency
Timeliness
Ad hoc attributes
Cost efficiency
Time efficiency
Compliance
Terms and 
conditions
Privacy
Information security
People
Reputation
Worker
Group
Availability
Diversity
Robustness
Learnability
Task
Profile
Experiences
Conscientiousness
Openness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Neuroticism
SkillsCredentials Certificates
Badges
Reliability
Requester Generosity
Communicativity
Fairness
Promptness
Non-collusiveness
Clarity
Usability
Description
Age
Gender
Location
Incentives ExtrinsicIntrinsic
IP protection
Motivation
Fig. 6: Heat map of the quality model.
In order to understand these
numbers better, it is necessary to
disaggregate them. For instance, it
is important to note that worker
profiles are typically kept simple
by the marketplace platforms (e.g.,
Mechanical Turk or CrowdFlower),
while they are more sophisticated
for auction-/contest-based platforms
that target skilled freelances (e.g.,
Topcoder or 99designs). In fact, the
former (but also the research pro-
totypes that target the coordination
of multiple tasks on top of existing
marketplace platforms) mostly fo-
cus on simple microtasks for which
the problem usually is finding work-
ers at all, not finding the best ones
possible; in the latter platforms, in-
stead, the profile has an advertising
purpose as well and therefore plays
a more important role. All platforms generally protect the privacy of their users; the
research prototypes adopt the policies of the underlying platform, while the platforms
for freelancers may disclose personal information to enable transactions among col-
laborating actors. Support for IP protection comes in the form of NDAs or transfer
agreements for freelancers. Worker assessment seems mostly based on skills, reliabil-
ity, badges and/or reputation. That is, crowdsourcing tends to be meritocratic.
However, overall there is only little support for the different quality attributes iden-
tified in these articles. Mostly, this is explained by the different focus of research (wide
spectrum of attributes) and commercial practice (narrow focus). For both areas, we
identify the following points as possible future research directions:
— Personality. The character and behavior of workers and requesters, acknowledged by
research as directly impacting the quality of outputs and the satisfaction of both,
is commonly neglected by state-of-the-art instruments. Yet, there seems to be an
opportunity for platforms that also aim to improve the attitude of people, e.g., by
facilitating the creation of shared values, social contacts, or social norms. People that
feel well in their workplace perform better and are more engaged in their work.
— Transparency. In general, while workers on many platforms are anonymous to re-
questers, it is important to note that requesters are even more anonymous to work-
ers. In order to increase mutual trust, it is advisable that also requesters be as-
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sessed properly and participate more actively in the actual work. How this assess-
ment and/or collaboration could happen is not straightforward in a domain where
each new task may put into communication completely new and unknown actors.
— Group work. While there are first attempts of organizing workers into groups and to
facilitate the collaboration between workers and requesters, the quality and benefit
of group work is still not fully studied and understood. In this respect, we believe the
attributes considered so far are not sufficient to help characterize the quality of and
leverage on the full power of the crowd. But first of all, more support for group work
and collaboration by the platforms themselves is needed.
— User interface quality. Surprisingly, only very little attention is paid by the studied
platforms to the quality of the user interface of tasks deployed by requesters. Some
platforms (e.g., CrowdFlower) provide crowdsourcing as a service to their customers,
whereby they also design and control the quality of the respective UIs. Yet, on the
one hand, usability and learnability are still concepts that have not percolated into
concrete tools and, on the other hand, they are still too generic as attributes to really
help requesters to develop better interfaces.
6.2. Quality Assessment
Fingerprinting
Exec. log analysis
Ground truth
User study
Self-assessment
Referrals
Personality test
Voting
Feedback aggreg.
Usability check
Qualification test
Association analysis
Expert review
Group
Computation-
based
Individual
Quality 
Assessment Peer review
Rating
Implicit feedback
Achievements
Group consensus
Output agreement
Content analysis
Transfer learning
Collusion detection
Outlier analysis
Fig. 7: Assessment heat map
Figure 7 illustrates the support of the discussed as-
sessment methods. As in the case of the quality
model, also here we see that only about half of the
methods identified previously are also implemented
by current crowdsourcing platforms. Rating (9 out of
14) and voting (6/14) are the most prominent assess-
ment methods, the former mostly used by requesters
to assess work/workers, the latter mostly used by
workers for the peer assessment of work/workers. It
is further evident that the current support of assess-
ment methods is mostly limited to technically simple
methods, while more complex capabilities are crowd-
sourced themselves. For instance, the group assess-
ment methods are well developed overall, while the
computation-based methods are still limited.
Again, it is good to disaggregate the numbers. While rating is almost the only feed-
back mechanism in the marketplace platforms, and it is essential for the proper func-
tioning of the platforms based on contests, it is interesting to note that almost none of
the research prototypes makes use of rating. Instead, given their focus on the coordi-
nation of tasks these platforms heavily leverage on voting for quality assessment, an
activity that naturally involves multiple workers and possibly the requester and exter-
nal experts. In line with the limited user profiles featured by typical marketplace plat-
forms, they instead prominently propose the use of qualification tests to select workers.
On the contrary, the auction- and contest-based platforms bet on achievements as an
automated technique to assess performance (e.g., badges).
For the future, we identify the following challenges in terms of quality assessment:
— Self-assessment. This assessment method is underestimated by current practice, de-
spite its proven benefit to learning and to the quality of produced outputs. How to
make self-assessment an integral and integrated part of crowdsourcing in general is
however non trivial and still open.
— User interface assessment. In line with our comment on the quality attributes re-
garding UI quality, also in terms of assessment methods there is huge room for im-
provement. Significant effort still needs to be invested into the development of proper
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guidelines for the design of intuitive and robust task UIs, as well as into automated
methods of their assessment, e.g., as attempted by Miniukovich and De Angeli [2015].
— Runtime analytics. Assessment methods are mostly applied after task execution,
while they could easily be applied also during task execution to enable preemptive
interventions aimed at increasing quality while a task is being worked on. Suitable
analytics features and interventions could not only improve the accuracy of outputs,
but also their timeliness and cost efficiency.
6.3. Quality Assurance
Quality 
assurance
Improve
data quality
Train people
Tailor rewards
Aggregate outputs
Improve usability
Filter outputs
Provide feedback
Teamwork
Teach workers
Reserve workers
Pay bonus
Prime workers
Control task order
Cleanse data
Incentivize 
people
Improve
task design
Control execution
Iterative improvem.
Promote workers
Valid. worker inputs
Lower complexity
Separate duties
Filter workers
Recruit teams
Assign workers
Inter-task coord.
Select people
Improve intrinsic 
motivation
Improve extrinsic 
motivation
Reject workers
Social transparency
Self-monitoring
Share purpose
Situated crowds.
Promote tasks
Recommend tasks
Dyn. instant. tasks
Flood task list
Decompose task
Gamify task
Prompt for rationale
Introduce breaks
Embrace error
Fig. 8: Heat map of assurance model
Finally, Figure 8 illustrates the state of the
art in quality assurance. It is surprising to
see that the spectrum of assurance actions
introduced earlier in this articles is explored
almost completely by current crowdsourcing
platforms. Of course, the tailoring of the re-
ward (11 out of 14) dominates, but also fil-
ter outputs (8/14) and filter workers (6/14) are
adopted relatively widely. Prompting for ra-
tionals is supported where requesters can de-
sign task input forms or interact with workers
(8/14). Only situated crowdsourcing, prime
workers, improve usability (out of the control
of platforms), reserve workers, and flood task
list are not supported by any of the platforms.
The disaggregation of the data reveals
that the strong support of inter-task coordi-
nation (7/14) and task order control (5/14)
mostly stems from the research prototypes
that specifically focus on this aspect. To the
best of our knowledge, only CrowdFlower internally uses a workflow engine for task
automation, and only Innocentive seems to make use of task recommendations. In-
terestingly, it appears that the research community with its prototypes for task au-
tomation mostly concentrates on assuring quality by promoting actions with effects
that are limited to a given context only, e.g., controlling the order of tasks or splitting
tasks into smaller chunks. Commercial platforms rather look at more comprehensive
actions, such as intrinsic motivators (e.g, social transparency) or team building, which
have effects that cross tasks and are longer lasting in nature.
We identify the following points as crucial aspects to approach next:
— Task recommendation. With the increase of the popularity of crowdsourcing, both
the number of workers and that of tasks published on crowdsourcing platforms is
destined to grow. It is thus increasingly hard for workers to find tasks they are inter-
ested in, capable of, and good at. This asks crowdsourcing platforms to help match
workers and work, which means recommending tasks to workers with the right skills.
Research is very active in this area, but support for custom worker profiles and rec-
ommendation algorithms is still missing.
— Long-term relationships. To make crowdsourcing sustainable in the longer term, it
may be necessary that requesters and workers establish more tight relationships,
e.g., to train workers with skills that will serve them in the future and assure them
predefined levels of income. Continuous and task-specific training must turn into
common practice and be seen as an investment by both workers and requesters.
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— Workflow integration. Finally, with the increasing complexity of work that is crowd-
sourced, the need for coordination and automation will increase too. So far, the prob-
lem has been studied only in the form of isolated research prototypes. The challenge
now is conceiving principles, techniques and tools that enable the seamless integra-
tion of crowd workflows into existing IT and business practices.
7. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
By now, crowdsourcing is a well established practice and a concrete option to solve
problems that neither individuals nor computers may be able to solve on their own (nor
together), while they can be solved by asking help to contributors that are not known
but that can bring in their human intelligence. With this survey, we comprehensively
studied one of the key challenges of crowdsourcing, i.e., quality control. We analyzed
literature on crowdsourcing published in major journals and conferences from 2009
onwards and synthesized a quality model that represents all the attributes that have
been studied so far to understand quality in crowdsourcing. We accompanied the model
with a comprehensive discussion of the methods and actions that have been used to
assess quality and to enforce quality, respectively. From the survey it is evident that,
although quality control is perceived as crucial by all actors involved in crowdsourcing
and significant effort has already been invested into it, we are still far from a practice
without quality issues that effectively delivers human intelligence to its customers.
We consider the following two areas for future work as particularly critical to guar-
antee quality and sustainability in the longer term:
— Domain-specific services. Most crowdsourcing platforms, especially micro-task plat-
forms and research prototypes, still position themselves as technology providers
managing the crowd and tasks from an abstract point of view. Crowdsourcing a piece
of work thus requires requesters to possess intimate crowdsourcing expertise (e.g.,
to control quality) and to “program” the crowd on their own. To make crowdsourcing
more accessible, domain-specific service providers that know the domain require-
ments, tasks and concerns and that can effectively assist also less skilled requesters
in all phases of the crowdsourcing process are needed. CrowdFlower, for example,
already positions itself as a Data Science platform; platforms for creative tasks like
99designs or Topcoder are domain-specific by design. Research on quality control has
produced significant contributions so far, but it too needs to focus on domain-specific
aspects if it wants to excel. Guaranteeing the quality of labels for images is just so
different from doing so, e.g., for text translations.
— Crowd work regulation and ethics. Crowdsourcing is a worldwide phenomenon and
practice that allows workers and requesters from all over the world to establish busi-
ness relationships. Yet, common rules and regulations for crowd work, e.g., regard-
ing taxation, pension, superannuation, resolution of disputes and similar, are still
missing. Each crowdsourcing provider provides its own rules and legal protections so
far, if at all. Similarly, the ecosystem as a whole (including workers, requesters and
platform providers alike) needs to grow shared work ethics and standards. Mobile-
Works, for instance, guarantees its workers hourly wages, but this can only represent
a starting point for sustainable crowd work. On the IT research side, controlling the
compliance of rules, regulations and ethical aspects may ask for novel monitoring
and assessment techniques, e.g., in the context of collusion detection.
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Table II: Representative literature references for the identified quality attributes.
References
Q
ua
li
ty
M
od
el
D
at
a
Accuracy Hansen et al. [2013], Kazai [2011a], Yin et al. [2014], Cao et al. [2014], Eickhoff
et al. [2012], Kulkarni et al. [2012a], Kern et al. [2010]
Consistency Huang and Fu [2013b], Eickhoff et al. [2012]
Timeliness Kittur et al. [2013], Lasecki et al. [2013], Lasecki et al. [2013], Yin et al. [2014]
Ad hoc attributes Yu et al. [2014], Nguyen et al. [2014]
Ta
sk
Ta
sk
de
sc
. Clarity Hossfeld et al. [2014], Tokarchuk et al. [2012], Georgescu et al. [2012], Kulkarni
et al. [2012b]
Complexity Hu et al. [2012], Rogstadius et al. [2011], Difallah et al. [2013]
U
se
r
in
te
rf
. Usability Khanna et al. [2010], Noronha et al. [2011], Retelny et al. [2014], Alagarai Sam-
path et al. [2014]
Learnability Willett et al. [2012], Heer and Bostock [2010]
Robustness Eickhoff et al. [2012], Hung et al. [2013a]
In
-
ce
nt
. Extrinsic Hossfeld et al. [2014], Singer and Mittal [2013], Eickhoff et al. [2012]
Intrinsic Hossfeld et al. [2014], Eickhoff et al. [2012]
Te
rm
s
&
co
nd
.
Privacy Lasecki et al. [2013], Boutsis and Kalogeraki [2016]
IP protection Vukovic and Bartolini [2010]
Information security Vukovic and Bartolini [2010], Amor et al. [2016]
Compliance Wolfson and Lease [2011], Wang et al. [2012], Irani and Silberman [2013]
P
er
f. Cost efficiency Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich [2014], Rokicki et al. [2014],
Time efficiency Eickhoff et al. [2012], Lin et al. [2014], Hung et al. [2013b], Kucherbaev et al.
[2016b], Cheng et al. [2015a]
P
eo
pl
e
R
eq
ue
s-
te
r.
Communicativity Irani and Silberman [2013]
Generosity Irani and Silberman [2013]
Fairness Irani and Silberman [2013], Allahbakhsh et al. [2012]
Promptness Irani and Silberman [2013]
W
or
ke
r P
ro
fil
e
Age Kazai [2011b]
Gender Kazai [2011b]
Location Kazai [2011b], Eickhoff et al. [2012], Kazai et al. [2012]
Openness Kazai [2011b], Kazai et al. [2012]
Conscientiousness Kazai [2011b], Kazai et al. [2012]
Extraversion Kazai [2011b], Kazai et al. [2012]
Agreeableness Kazai [2011b], Kazai et al. [2012]
Neuroticism Kazai [2011b], Kazai et al. [2012]
Motivation Kobayashi et al. [2015]
C
r. Skills Difallah et al. [2013], Schall et al. [2014], Mavridis et al. [2016]
Certificates Allahbakhsh et al. [2013]
E
xp
. Badges Anderson et al. [2013], Scekic et al. [2013a],
Reliability Kazai [2011a], Dalvi et al. [2013], Demartini et al. [2013], Sakurai et al. [2013],
Raykar and Yu [2011]
Reputation Allahbakhsh et al. [2013], De Alfaro et al. [2011]
G
ro
up Availability Li et al. [2014], Ambati et al. [2012]
Diversity Surowiecki [2005], Livshits and Mytkowicz [2014], Willett et al. [2012]
Non-collusiveness KhudaBukhsh et al. [2014]
Perf. = Performance — Cr. = Credentials — Exp. = Experience — Incent. = Incentives
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Table III: Representative literature references for the identified assessment methods.
References
Q
ua
li
ty
A
ss
es
sm
en
t
In
di
vi
du
al
Rating Dalvi et al. [2013], Yu et al. [2014], Nguyen et al. [2014], Sakurai et al. [2013], Irani and
Silberman [2013], Hata et al. [2017], Gaikwad et al. [2016]
Qualification test Heer and Bostock [2010]
Self-assessment Dow et al. [2012], Sakurai et al. [2013], Shah and Zhou [2015], Shah and Zhou [2016]
Personality test Kazai [2011b], Kazai et al. [2012], Irani and Silberman [2013]
Referrals Bozzon et al. [2012]
Expert review Dow et al. [2012], Hung et al. [2015]
Usability check Nielsen et al. [2002], Willett et al. [2012]
G
ro
up
Voting Kulkarni et al. [2012a], Little et al. [2010b], Caragiannis et al. [2014] ,Sun and Dance [2012]
Group consensus Sheshadri and Lease [2013], Eickhoff et al. [2012], Zhang et al. [2015], Kairam and Heer
[2016]
Output agreement Waggoner and Chen [2014], Huang and Fu [2013b], Jagabathula et al. [2014]
Peer review Hansen et al. [2013], Zhu et al. [2014], Whiting et al. [2017]
Feedback aggreg. Dalvi et al. [2013], Allahbakhsh et al. [2012], Laureti et al. [2006], Yu et al. [2006], Ignjatovic
et al. [2008], Hung et al. [2013b], Joglekar et al. [2013], Davtyan et al. [2015]
User study Willett et al. [2012], Khanna et al. [2010], Alagarai Sampath et al. [2014]
C
om
pu
ta
ti
on
-b
as
ed
Ground truth Huang and Fu [2013b], Eickhoff et al. [2012], Hara et al. [2013], Oleson et al. [2011], Le et al.
[2010], Lasecki et al. [2014], Von Ahn et al. [2008], Liu et al. [2013], El Maarry et al. [2015]
Outlier analysis Rzeszotarski and Kittur [2012], Jung and Lease [2011], Marcus et al. [2012]
Fingerprinting Rzeszotarski and Kittur [2011], Rzeszotarski and Kittur [2012], Kazai and Zitouni [2016]
Achievements Massung et al. [2013]
Implicit feedback Adler and De Alfaro [2007], Adler et al. [2011], Lin et al. [2014], Difallah et al. [2013]
Association analysis Rajasekharan et al. [2013],
Exec. log analysis Kucherbaev et al. [2016b], Heymann and Garcia-Molina [2011], Huynh et al. [2013], Jung
et al. [2014], KhudaBukhsh et al. [2014], Moshfeghi et al. [2016]
Content analysis Artz and Gil [2007], Difallah et al. [2013], Alagarai Sampath et al. [2014], Yang et al. [2016]
Transfer learning Mo et al. [2013], Fang et al. [2014], Zhao et al. [2013]
Collusion detection KhudaBukhsh et al. [2014], Marcus et al. [2012], Allahbakhsh et al. [2014]
Table IV: Summary of the exemplary usage of assessment methods by the literature
referenced in Section 4. A bullet • in a cell means the method has been used to measure
the respective attribute in the quality model.
Quality Model
Data
Task People
Task
desc.
User
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E
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n
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ne
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N
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n
Sk
ill
s
C
er
ti
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at
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B
ad
ge
s
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y
R
ep
ut
at
io
n
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
D
iv
er
si
ty
N
on
-c
ol
lu
si
ve
ne
ss
Q
ua
li
ty
A
ss
es
sm
en
t
In
di
vi
du
al
Rating • • • • • • • • • • •
Qualification test •
Self-assessment • • • •
Personality test • • • • •
Referrals • •
Expert review • • •
Usability check • • • •
G
ro
up
Voting •
Group consensus • • •
Output agreement • •
Peer review • • • •
Feedback aggreg. • • • •
User study • • • • • • • •
C
om
pu
ta
ti
on
-b
as
ed
Ground truth • •
Outlier analysis • • •
Fingerprinting • •
Achievements •
Implicit feedback • •
Association analysis •
Exec. log analysis • • • • • • •
Content analysis • • • •
Transfer learning • • •
Collusion detection •
Perf. = Performance — Cr. = Credentials — Exp. = Experience
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Table V: Representative literature references for the identified assurance actions.
References
Q
ua
li
ty
A
ss
ur
an
ce
Im
pr
ov
e
da
ta
qu
al
it
y
Cleanse data Khazankin et al. [2012], Schulze et al. [2013], Bozzon et al. [2012], Bigham et al.
[2010]
Aggregate outputs Surowiecki [2005], Aydin et al. [2014], Ho et al. [2016], Gao et al. [2016], Ok et al.
[2016], Liu and Wang [2012], De Alfaro et al. [2015], Ukkonen et al. [2015]
Filter outputs Dow et al. [2012], Hansen et al. [2013], Rao et al. [2013], Marcus et al. [2012], Jung
and Lease [2012], Zhuang and Young [2015], Wauthier and Jordan [2011]
Iterative improvement Little et al. [2010b], Little et al. [2010a], Kulkarni et al. [2012a]
Se
le
ct
pe
op
le
Filter workers Allahbakhsh et al. [2013], Zhao et al. [2013], Kazai et al. [2012], Li et al. [2014],
Allahbakhsh et al. [2012], Hara et al. [2013], Abraham et al. [2016], Nushi et al.
[2015]
Reject workers Difallah et al. [2012], Lasecki et al. [2014], Difallah et al. [2012], Bozzon et al. [2013],
Marcus et al. [2012], Allahbakhsh et al. [2014]
Assign workers Kulkarni et al. [2012b], Allahbakhsh et al. [2013], Difallah et al. [2013], Kulkarni
et al. [2014], Ho and Vaughan [2012], Roy et al. [2015], Kobren et al. [2015]
Recommend tasks Bernstein et al. [2012], Yuen et al. [2015], Lin et al. [2014]
Promote tasks Hu et al. [2012], Kulkarni et al. [2012b], Nath et al. [2012], [Oosterman and Houben
2016]
Situated crowdsourcing Hosio et al. [2014], Heimerl et al. [2012], Vaish et al. [2014], Niforatos et al. [2016]
Recruit teams Vukovic et al. [2010], Schall et al. [2012], Retelny et al. [2014], Li et al. [2014], Ro-
kicki et al. [2015]
In
ce
nt
iv
iz
e
pe
op
le
E
xt
r.
Tailor rewards Faradani et al. [2011], Mao et al. [2013], Scekic et al. [2013a], Sakurai et al. [2013],
Singer and Mittal [2013], Rokicki et al. [2014], Ho et al. [2015], Radanovic and Falt-
ings [2016], Ikeda and Bernstein [2016], Scekic et al. [2013a], Kobren et al. [2015]
Pay bonus Scekic et al. [2013a], Difallah et al. [2014], Yin et al. [2014], Yu et al. [2014], Faltings
et al. [2014]
Promote workers Scekic et al. [2013a], Dow et al. [2012], Scekic et al. [2013b]
In
tr
.
Share purpose Dontcheva et al. [2014], Mao et al. [2013], Kobayashi et al. [2015], Kaufman et al.
[2016]
Self-monitoring Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich [2014], Scekic et al. [2013a], Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich
[2014], Rokicki et al. [2014], Dontcheva et al. [2014], Preist et al. [2014]
Social transparency Huang and Fu [2013a], Huang and Fu [2013a], Vie´gas et al. [2007], Yu et al. [2014],
Feyisetan and Simperl [2016]
Gamify task Ahn [2006], Krause and Kizilcec [2015], Law et al. [2016], Feyisetan et al. [2015]
T
ra
in
pe
op
le Prime workers Morris et al. [2012], Alagarai Sampath et al. [2014], Faltings et al. [2014]Teach workers Dontcheva et al. [2014], Yu et al. [2014], Doroudi et al. [2016], Singla et al. [2014]
Provide feedback Dow et al. [2012], Zhu et al. [2014], Kulkarni et al. [2012a], Yu et al. [2014]
Team work Kittur [2010], Andre´ et al. [2014], Dorn et al. [2012]
Im
pr
ov
e
ta
sk
de
si
gn
Lower complexity Rogstadius et al. [2011], Anderton et al. [2013], Cheng et al. [2015b]
Decompose task Kittur et al. [2011], Kulkarni et al. [2012a]
Separate duties Bernstein et al. [2010], Kulkarni et al. [2012a]
Validate worker inputs Bragg et al. [2013], Quinn and Bederson [2014]
Improve usability Nielsen et al. [2002], Khanna et al. [2010], Kazai [2011a], Willett et al. [2012], Ala-
garai Sampath et al. [2014], Kittur et al. [2008]
Prompt for rationale McDonnell et al. [2016], Drapeau et al. [2016]
Introduce breaks Dai et al. [2015]
Embrace error Krishna et al. [2016]
C
on
tr
ol
ex
ec
ut
io
n
Reserve workers Bernstein et al. [2012], Lasecki et al. [2013], Bigham et al. [2010]
Flood task list Chilton et al. [2010], Bernstein et al. [2012]
Dyn. instantiate tasks Kucherbaev et al. [2016b], Bozzon et al. [2013], Yan et al. [2011], Li et al. [2016],
Tran-Thanh et al. [2015], Chen et al. [2013], Karger et al. [2011], Karger et al.
[2014], Bansal et al. [2016]
Control task order Vesdapunt et al. [2014], Marcus et al. [2012], Lasecki et al. [2015], Newell and Ruths
[2016], Eickhoff and de Vries [2013], Difallah et al. [2016]
Inter-task coordination Bozzon et al. [2013], Little et al. [2010b], Minder and Bernstein [2012], Kucherbaev
et al. [2016a]
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Table VI: Summary of the exemplary usage of assurance actions by the literature ref-
erenced in Section 4. A bullet • in a cell means the action has been used to act on the
respective attribute in the quality model.
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N
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Q
ua
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ty
A
ss
ur
an
ce
Im
pr
ov
e
da
ta
qu
al
it
y Cleanse data • • •
Aggregate outputs •
Filter outputs • • •
Iterative improvem. • • •
Se
le
ct
pe
op
le
Filter workers • • • • • • • • • •
Reject workers • • • •
Assign workers • • •
Recommend tasks •
Promote tasks • • • • •
Situated crowds. •
Recruit teams • • • • •
In
ce
nt
iv
iz
e
pe
op
le
E
xt
r. Tailor rewards • • • • • • •
Pay bonus • • • • • •
Promote workers • • •
In
tr
. Share purpose • • • • •
Self-monitoring • • •
Social transparency • • • •
Gamify task • • •
T
ra
in
pe
op
le
Prime workers • •
Teach workers • • •
Provide feedback • • •
Teamwork • •
Im
pr
ov
e
ta
sk
de
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gn
Lower complexity • • •
Decompose task • • •
Separate duties •
Validate inputs • • •
Improve usability • • • •
Prompt for rationale • •
Introduce breaks • •
Embrace error • •
C
on
tr
ol
ex
ec
ut
io
n Reserve workers • •
Flood task list • •
Dyn. inst. tasks • • • •
Control task order • • •
Inter-task coord. • • •
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